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CURRENT ISSUES IN ILLINOIS SCHOOL LAW:
THE CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE
Patrick A. Keenan*
The theory and practice of providing educational services are frequently
divergent and Professor Keenan's article focuses upon the more important
aspects of this divergence-school organization, student discipline, teacher
and administrator termination, and special education classification. The
author advocates the recognition of students as consumers, rather than
as inmates of the educational system. The practitioner, after reading
Professor Keenan's article, will be better prepared to argue for some
legal resolution of the disparity between what the public intends its educators to do and what is actually being done in our educational system.

E

INTRODUCTION

Erikson opines that the deadliest of all sins is the mutila,tion of a child's spirit. 1 The Supreme Court has instructed us
that first amendment rights are available to teacher and students,
neither of whom shed their constitutional rights at the school-house
gate.2 Erikson's moral point is presently far from the Justices' tentative statement about what should be obvious. The appearance of
such a statement and similar ones in the holdings of the several courts
portends at least the hope of a convergence of opinion. The era of
RIK

a supposedly benign, too often perverse dictatorship of the school
board and school administration under the doctrine of in loco paren-

tis is being drawn, kicking and screaming, to a close. The schools
are very slowly becoming defeudalized and perhaps even a scintilla
* Assistant Professor, DePaul College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the DePaul students who assisted in researching this article: Patricia Merriman, Ciel Misles, Karen Sorenson and particularly the students who assisted in
drafting; Robert Melone (Sections II and IV) and Diamond Mendonides (Section

III).
1. INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION, No. 11 at 56 (March 1972). Erikson's entire
quote follows: "Some day, maybe, there will exist a well-informed, well-considered,
and yet fervent public conviction that the most deadly of all possible sins is the
mutilation of a child's spirit; for such mutilation undercuts the life principle of
trust, without which every human act, may it feel ever so good and seem ever so
right, is prone to perversion by destructive forms of conscientiousness."
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969).
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democratized. This article examines from the consumer's (i.e., the
student's) perspective some of the legal steps, taken and poised, in
the process as it is happening in Illinois schools.
The article begins with background information, including the institutional structure. (Section I). Section II concentrates on students'
rights to free expression and due process. Educators' rights are treated
in Section III. The new special education rules are described in
Section IV. The remainder, particularly Section V on Serrano,3
Rodriguez4 and their progeny of broken promises, gets rather short
shrift.
Each of the subjects considered is extremely complex and an appropriate subject for a separate article. This article emphasizes the
plight of the younger student, the Illinois secondary school pupil,
quoting from the higher education sources as needed. In general,
judicial extensions of students' constitutional rights tend to reach
all schools regardless of whether the original civil rights plaintiff was a high school or college student.
All the cases cited are not from Illinois, for the body of constitutional law applied to the school is growing, and decisions from other
states or federal circuits may be directly and presently applicable to
Illinois schools by Illinois courts.
The number of reported cases in the school law area is still relatively small, given the corporate complexity of the education monopoly, its boards, its politics, its economics as well as the enormous
body of statutes, rules and customs controlling the entire area. One
reason is the previously silent (where noise equals litigation and legal
sophistication) nature of the consumers. High school students can't
afford lawyers-though teachers often can.
Yet the decisions are coming in, perhaps regrettably. The school
superintendents' function should be something other than constantly
determining how to avoid litigation-an often counterproductive,
contra-educational pursuit with shrinking success usually inversely
proportional to effort.5
3.

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).

4. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
5. A symptom of this failure is the appearance of a new section in the
Illinois statutes defining school board duties authorizing or mandating the purchase of liability insurance specifically to protect employees from judgments in
civil rights cases. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-22.3, 34-18.1 (Supp.
1972).
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In this survey of school law, admittedly presented from the consumer perspective, it is hoped that both observers and practitioners
will find material that proves useful. The scope is somewhat beyond
a strict 1973 Survey as this is the first annual installment on the subject, and is therefore comprised of some background and considerable
omission. Perhaps next year's chapter need not be so impressionistic.
I.

BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Section I contains some historical notes on Illinois education laws and
legal machinery, the present organization of the state's educational
establishment, and the current statutory scheme with some of its
most recent changes.
Illinois has had universal and compulsory education since 1883.6
Like their counterparts throughout the land, Illinois legislators,
school boards, and school administrators have grounded their action
on a widespread and, until quite recently inviolable, set of philosophical and legal assumptions. It's good for all children to go to
the same public school. The legislature can dictate the curriculum.
The school stands in the shoes of the parents as the prime medium of
inculcation of a God-given moral, political and economic system and
its concomitant discipline. The teacher's word is law. The local
school board, elected by parents, friends and neighbors, exercises its
benevolent stewardship of the school's finances and sex education
courses. Students study, teachers teach. Truancy and other problems
are dealt with and education must then happen.
Illinois school machinery grew up on these assumptions as the
present establishment naturally reflects. Some familiarity with the
confusing array of institutional structures and school districts is an
essential precondition for usefully discussing the law which enables
and controls them.
A. Elementary and Secondary School Structures
As recently as 1945 there were approximately 12,000 school districts in Illinois. 7 Legislation enacted to stimulate the consolidation
of school districts has successfully reduced their number to its pres6. Ill. Laws [1883] at 167.
7. Elementary school districts are numbered under 200 (District 63, 89, 151),
secondary school districts under 300 (District 204, 209, 218) and junior college
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ent level of slightly over 1,000. Despite this reduction, the complex
organization of the state's public school system continues to bewilder many practitioners. The Illinois School Code, chapter 122 of
the Illinois Revised Statutes, enables several different types of school
districts:
1. Community consolidated school districts, community
unit school districts, and consolidated school districts.'
2. High school districts, non-high school districts (that is
districts which contract out all their secondary level students to other public schools).'
3. Special charter districts.' °
4. Districts for cities with a population of less than
1,000.11
5. Districts for cities with a population not less than
1,000 and not more than 500,000.12
6. Districts for cities with a population not less than
100,000 and not more than 500,000.',
7. Districts for cities with a population greater than
500,000.14
8. Special purpose districts for purposes of providing
special education or other unique educational reArticle 13, as recently amended, provides
sources.'
for a new district within the Department of Correc6
tions.'
7
9. Special education cooperative districts.'
The designation of a particular school district depends upon several
factors including tax base, population, nature of the educational redistricts over 500 (Junior College District 504, 505). The district numbers are
often preceded by the name of a town, township or locality, and followed by the
county where it is situated.
8.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 11 (Supp. 1972).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. § 12.
Id. § 32.
Id. H8 10-1 et seq.
Id. § 10-10 et seq.
Id. H§ 33-1 et seq.
Id. H§ 34-1 et seq.

15.

Id.

16.
17.

ld. H§ 13-40 to 13-45.
ld. §H 10-22.31, 22.31a.

88 14-1 et seq.
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sources and the boundary characteristics of the individual area.
Once designated, the school district becomes subject to a particular
set of statutory provisions affecting both the operation and the funding of its educational facilities. A description of the legal and political processes utilized in determining the type of school board in a
district is beyond the scope of this article. 8
The Supreme Court has declared that Illinois school districts are
quasi-municipal corporations 9 with no inherent powers. They are
entirely creatures of the General Assembly which is the source of
all their powers.2 0 School districts do not own the educational facilities located within their boundaries. Such facilities are the property
of the state and as such are subject to legislative disposition. The
General Assembly may consolidate,2 ' divide, 22 or otherwise alter
school districts23 and has complete control over their configuration.24
The school board governs the school district. Statutory provisions
define the qualifications for membership and the procedure for the
election of board members. 25 They are not paid and act from motives of public service. The board members control all financial
matters, let bids and have autonomous authority to enter into contracts. They determine who sells the district its fuel, supplies, services, land, new construction, and they choose its legal counsel.
18.

For more detailed descriptions, see

ILL. INST. OF CONT. LEGAL EDUC., SHORT

COURSE FOR ILLINOIS SCHOOL ATTORNEYS, SCHOOL BOARD ORGANIZATION

1-18 (1972).

19. People v. Furman, 26 Ill. 2d 334, 186 N.E.2d 262 (1962).
20. Dato v. Veron Hills, 62 Ill. App. 2d 274, 210 N.E.2d 626 (1965).
21. Dixon v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 3, 2 Ill. 2d 454, 118 N.E.2d
241 (1954).
22. Id.
23. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N.E.2d 581 (1948) (contraction);
Bd. of Educ. of Spaulding School Dist. No. 58, 32 Il1. 2d 342, 205 N.E.2d 459
(1965) (annexation).
24. Community Unit Dist. No. 6 of Macon and Christian Counties v. County
Bd. of School Trustees of Sangamon County, 9 Ill. App. 2d 116, 132 N.E.2d 584
(1956). The General Assembly has provided procedures by which a new district
can be created. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 7 etseq. (1971).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-10, 9-1 (1971). Chicago Board of Education members are not elected but appointed by the mayor, ch. 122, § 34-3. The
fact that Chicago schools are governed by political appointees while all others are
subject to the control of elected officials and the electorate was held not to be a
violation of equal protection in Latham v. Bd. of Educ., 31 Ill. 2d 178, 185-86,
201 N.E.2d 111 (1964).
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Board members also control the more mundane matters of school
administration such as the hiring and firing of teachers, the discipline of students, and establishment of appropriate educational programs.
The Superintendent of the Educational Service Region (ESR),
formerly the County Superintendent of Schools, supervises and in
theory exercises some control over the public schools within a designated region. The Superintendent, elected under the provisions of
the Illinois School Code, has the authority to inspect school operations and to receive financial and attendance reports from the treasurers of the various school boards under his supervision.2 6
The Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI)
has the responsibility for the general supervision of all public and
some private Illinois schools.2I Specifically, OSPI may issue rules
and regulations to implement educational legislation, act as legal advisor to the public school system, and set standards for the recognition of schools. Additionally, the Code requires the OSPI to provide a variety of other services such as research, grant administration,
and organizational assistance.
B.

Higher Education Organization

The Illinois system of public higher education is administered
through five independent agencies. These are:
1.
2.

Board of Regents of Regency Universities."8
Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities.2 9

3.

University of Illinois. °
Southern Illinois University.3 1

4.
26.
27.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 3-14.11 (1971).
Id. §§ 2-3 et seq.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, H9 301-311 (1971).

28.
Included are Illinois State
University, Northern Illinois University, and Sangamon State University.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, H§ 1001-1009 (1971). Included are Chicago State
University, Eastern Illinois University, Governors State University, Northeastern
Illinois University, and Western Illinois University.
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, § 22-488. Included are the Urbana, Chicago Cir-

cle and Medical Center campuses.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, § 600-695. The Carbondale and Edwardsville
campuses of Southern Illinois University are included.
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5. Junior College Board. 2
The Board of Higher Education (BHE) is charged with coordination and supervision of these agencies. 3 Duties of the BHE include
approval of new units of instruction, budget recommendations, research and master planning. In order to perform these duties, the
BIlE has the authority to inspect books, records, and files of the
various agencies involved in public higher education. 4 The BHE
from time to time undertakes special duties of system-wide importance such as manpower planning and administration of various grant
programs.
The Board of Higher Education is a fairly strong and active coordinating board. It would be misleading, however, to assume that
the BHE exerts anything even resembling complete control over the
public higher education system. In essence, the BHE defines the
broad goals to which the various universities respond with specific
programs. The BHE reviews such programs and determines whether or not they are appropriate in view of overall system goals. The
BHE does not design specific programs to be initiated by the various
colleges and universities.
C. New Structures
The 1970 Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois called
for the establishment of a State Board of Education to supplant the
now existing Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.35
Initial legislation implementing that resolution was signed into law
in August of 1973. The State Board of Education will consist of
seventeen members selected on a regional basis. Initially Board
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, §§ 189 et seq. The Board supervises thirty-eight
college districts each with its own board and staff.
Id. §§ 182, 189, 190.
Id. § 192.
35. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 2 reads:
State Board of Education-Chief State Educational Officer. (a) There

32.
junior
33.
34.

is created a State Board of Education to be elected or selected on a regional basis. The number of members, other qualifications, terms of office
and manner of election or selection shall be provided by law.

The Board,

except as limited by law, may establish goals, determine policies, provide
for planning and evaluating education programs and recommend financing.

The Board shall have such other duties and powers as provided by law.
(b) The State Board of Education shall appoint a chief state educational
officer.
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members will serve either two, four or six year terms. Subsequent
terms will be for six years. Vacancies will be filled by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Members will be limited
to not more than two six year terms.
The full powers and duties of the Office of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction shall pass to the new State Board of Education by
1975. In the interim, the State Board of Education shall function
in an advisory capacity to the Office of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, having full access to records and staff now maintained
by the Superintendent. The State Board of Education will begin
by designing the legislative package necessary to accomplish the
constitutional goal. Three members of the new Board and three
members of the now existing Board of Higher Education will be
appointed to a joint Education Committee. The joint Education
Committee will be responsible for "developing policy on matters of
mutual concern to both elementary, secondary and higher education
such as Occupational and Career Education, Teacher Preparation
and Certification, Educational Finance, Articulation between Elementary, Secondary and Higher Education and Research and Plan-

ning. "36
This legislation has the potential to change considerably Illinois'
system of public education. The State Board of Education is free
to define its scope of activities and its relationships with local school
boards and state agencies by submitting appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly. At a minimum, the new Board assumes the powers of the Office of the Superintendent. Additional
powers can be requested.
The establishment of the Joint Education Committee provides an
administrative device to coordinate the entire spectrum of public educational activities. Though it seems to be very much the child of
the State Board of Education and the Board of Higher Education,
the Joint Education Committee must submit annual reports to these
two Boards and to the General Assembly. This power to directly
report to the General Assembly may give the Joint Education Committee a significant degree of authority in the coordination of public
educational activities.
36.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1A-I to 1A-4 (Supp. 1973).
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Of the enormous body of statutes dealing with Illinois schools,
only a very small portion have been construed by the appellate or
federal courts. A check of Shepard's Citationsindicates only a small
number of court opinions, whose paucity is grossly disproportionate
to the byzantine complexity of the legislative maze of the School Code
(ch. 122) and Higher Education Law (ch. 144).
Virtually all of the governing bodies, and many of the governing
persons, involved in Illinois education are authorized by the statutes to promulgate and enforce rules and make or review decisions
based on the laws and regulations. Arguably, due process would require all regulations to be written, published, and available free or
for copying.37 These rules and most of the decisions have the power, color and force of law. When faced with a case or question involving a law, rule, regulation or decision, the practitioners must
first isolate the level, legal effect and authorization for its promulgation. The individual with the authority to take the action must
also be identified. This simplistic advice is much easier to give than
to follow because the educational machinery is well versed in the
bureaucratic arts of obfuscating and diluting the credit or blame for
any act and of permanently losing or burying the rules by which
it was accomplished. Framing a legal issue with a part of the public
educational establishment can be very frustrating but not impossible. The process could include sending information copies of all
correspondence to the OSPI and Superintendent of ESR with a cover
letter reminding them of their review, appeal, and controversy-settling functions.3"
II.

THE RIGHTS OF ILLINOIS STUDENTS

It is difficult to ascertain the current state of the Illinois law of
student rights and discipline, and almost impossible to speculate on
the mundane reality of student rights and discipline in Illinois
schools. If, from the civil libertarian perspective, the schools have
in theory just entered the eighteenth century, the reality is still medieval.
This section attempts first to give a basic outline of the current
law of substantive student rights. The following section considers
37.
38.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10.7 (1971).
Id. at §§ 2-3.8, 3-2.
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the procedures which are supposed to be observed in visiting discipline
upon the students, with a glance toward a few of the specific infractions which invite such visitation.
Since the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,39 the courts, or at least
some of them, have recognized that students are in fact citizens of
the United States and that the public schools of the land, teaching
respect for the Constitution, must acknowledge its existence beyond
that of a mere historical curiosity. Students do have certain rights,
but the catalog, enumeration, scope and incidents of these rights are
ellusive. They have been established by a painful series of appellate
court decisions, mostly federal, which patiently instruct school administrators, board members and sometimes trial judges that teachers and students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.4"
Students' rights can be categorized as those clustered about the
first amendment, those protected by the due process clause, and
those which find other legal or constitutional bases. Violations of
the equal protection clause are rampant throughout the public
schools, but vindication of many of them has become a confusing
and problematical pursuit since the Nixon Court's pronouncement
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that educa-

tion is not among the rights either explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution. 4 ' Note that the due process rights are addressed
in the section on student discipline.42 The students' first amendment rights are engaged in cases concerning student newspapers,
hair and dress codes, and, occasionally, access to speakers or materials that say things which offend the politics or sensibilities of the
school administration.43
39.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

A precursor of Tinker, West Virginia State Bd. of

Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), wherein the Court upheld a student's right
to refuse to pledge allegiance to the flag, went practically unnoticed for the intervening quarter century.

40. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
41. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). It may, however, be protected under the Illinois
Constitution. See article X thereof and a ringing dissent by Justice Marshall,
411 U.S. at 70.
42. One of the best works on students' rights, from the students' view is S.
HANSEN & J. JENSEN, JR., THE LIrrLE RED SCHOOL BOOK (1971).
43. First amendment rights of teachers are discussed in the text accompanying
notes 164-192, infra.

412

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:402

The general rule is that a student's free expression-oral, written, or symbolic--cannot be proscribed so long as the expressive
activity (distributing a newspaper, wearing long hair) is not reasonably expected to disrupt the normal educational processes of the
school. This is the "forecast rule" of Tinker.44 This rule generally
holds true in both high schools and colleges, but the threshold of what
is likely to disrupt the normal educational processes is relatively
lower in Illinois high schools. In colleges, the doctrine of in loco
parentisis dead. In high schools it is perhaps only moribund.
A.

Limitations on Student Speech and Press"5

Despite the Supreme Court's application of first amendment principles of free speech to the public high school context,"' and the
Court's traditional view that the freedom to distribute a publication
without prior censorship is protected by the first amendment,4 7 the
majority of circuit courts hold that prior censorship of student publications is constitutionally permissible if supported by sufficient procedural safeguards. The Seventh Circuit, however, adheres to a
minority position that pre-publication censorship of student publications is an unconstitutional prior restraint of free speech.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District" the Supreme Court declared that there must be reasonable
parity between speech freedoms enjoyed by public school students
and first amendment freedoms applicable to the general society.
Schools are not totalitarian enclaves.4 9 While undoubtedly in a
special class, students are neither inmates in a jail nor patients in a
hospital where extraordinary restrictions of free speech may be
necessary. 0 Student speech-related conduct"1 may not be prohibited
absent a showing that such conduct would cause a substantial inter44. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
45. For a good discussion from the journalist's viewpoint, see Roth & Riley,
The Bill of Rights and the Student Press, CHICAGO JOURNALISM REVIEW 3-6 (January, 1973).
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
47. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
48. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
49. Id. at 511.
50. Id. at 512 n.6.
51. In Tinker, the students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam war.
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ference with requirements of proper discipline in the operation of
52
a school.
The freedom to distribute a publication without censorship has
long been associated with the first amendment.5 3 As applied to student publications, however, some courts have held that prior restraints of free speech are not unconstitutional per se, but can be
imposed if accompanied by reasonably specific procedural safeguards.
The Second Circuit, in Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,54 saw no constitutional bar to a school policy requiring prior
approval of student publications so long as approval procedures and
criteria were well-defined and the time period involved in the approval process was definite and not excessive. 55 In Quarterman v.
Byrd, 6 the Fourth Circuit struck down a policy requiring pre-distribution approval of student publications, not because of concerns
for the per se constitutional invalidity of such prior restraints, but
because the policy did not specify the criteria upon which approval
or denial would be based, and because the procedures for expedi57
tious review of the decision were not defined.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Shanley v. Northeast Independent
School District5 8 held that there was nothing unconstitutional per se
in a requirement that student publications be approved by school
officials prior to distribution" but that such a policy must be reasonably specific as to means by which students are to submit proposed materials, the time period during which approval is to be
granted or denied, and the procedure for review of the school official's decision."0
The Eisner, Quarterman and Shanley courts viewed Tinker as
permitting school officials to intervene in student speech-related con52. 393 U.S. at 511.
53. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
54. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 810-11.
56. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
57.

Id. at 59.

58.
59.
60.

462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
id. at 969.
Id. at 978.
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duct when a forecast of substantial disruption could be made. That
intervention could take the form of pre-distribution approval of student publications so long as sufficient procedural safeguards were insured. Recognizing that such policies constituted prior restraints,
these courts argued that prior restraints are not unconstitutional per
se but could be applied in special circumstances. 6 1
The Seventh Circuit has taken a thoroughly different approach.
Utilizing the cases of two Illinois high school student underground
newspapers writers, the court has effectively established freedom of
the student press.

In Scoville v. Board of Education6 2 the appellate

court overturned the expulsion of Ray Scoville for his publication
of GrassHigh holding:
High school students are persons entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protections. States and school officials have "comprehensive authority" to prescribe and control conduct in the schools through reasonable
rules consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards. Where rules
infringe upon freedom of expression, the school officials have the burden
of showing justification ....
However, the district court had no factual basis for, and made no meaningful application of, the proper rule of balancing the private interests of
plaintiffs' free expression against the state's interest in furthering the public
63
school system.

About a year thereafter a student at Bowen High School in Chicago repeated almost exactly Scoville's trick and published The Cosmic Frog without procuring prior permission. The Chicago Board
of Education repeated the Peoria Board's overreaction and suspended him. Surprisingly, in clear violation of the Scoville rule,
the suspension was sustained by the district court. 64 The Seventh
Circuit, perhaps irked at having to repeat itself, spoke in no uncertain terms by holding that the Chicago Board of Education Regulation 6-19, which required prior approval for distribution of student
publications, was an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech
and that disciplinary action for violation thereof must be reversed.
The Seventh Circuit in Fujishima v. Board of Education65 took
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1971).
425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
Id. at 13-14.
Civil No. 71-566 (N.D. I11.1971).
460 F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1972).
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direct issue with the Eisner interpretation of Tinker and bluntly declared it to be "unsound constitutional law." 6 6 The Tinker forecast
rule is a proper formula for determining when the requirements of
school discipline justify punishment of students for the exercise of their
first amendment rights. It is not a basis for establishing a system
of censorship and licensing designed to prevent the exercise of first
amendment rights. 67
The Seventh Circuit's vigorous rejection of prior restraints of student speech in the face of contrary opinions in the Second and
Fourth Circuits indicates that, short of a Supreme Court resolution
of the issue, Illinois practitioners can expect federal courts in the
Seventh Circuit to be quite receptive to student challenges of predistribution approval regulations. While the boards of education
may make reasonable regulations as to the time, place and manner
of distribution, they cannot prohibit distribution, and the burden of
showing the reasonableness of the rules will be placed on the boards.
Regulations which seek to mete out post-publication discipline to-students who distribute obscene or libelous material may not be precluded under Fujishima. Clearly pre-publication censorship is
prohibited in Illinois schools.6 8
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's declaration of the law does
not execute itself, and various sorts of prior restraints on student
publication and limitations on their distribution persist. The OSPI
could provide a significant service by publicizing and enforcing the
first amendment, in particular the prohibition against prior censorship of and punishment for distribution of the student press. The current Superintendent, Dr. Michael J. Bakalis, has from time to time
promised to do this, and to promulgate a code of rights and conduct
for Illinois students. Such a code has not yet appeared, and while
66. Id. at 1359.
67. Id.
68. Id. The First Circuit may share the Seventh Circuit's aversion to prior
restraint of student speech. In Riseman v. School Community of the City of
Quincy, 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971), the court struck down a regulation prohibiting the distribution of advertising materials in school facilities. As applied,
the regulation also prohibited the distribution of student publications. The First
Circuit voiced concern that the regulation did not reflect an effort to minimize
the adverse effect of prior restraints and struck down the policy. The court did
suggest that school officials could require that students file a copy of printed
materials prior to distribution.
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the first several drafts of the OSPI's magnum opus, the Illinois Program for Evaluation, Supervision and Recognition of Schools, addressed the rights of students in some detail, the final form contains
four pages of rather flabby generalities about responsibilities in a democracy, government of laws not of men, etc. 69 The only statement
about the critical subject of students' freedom of expression is the
following squib-rather a thin restatement of the robust thunder of
New York Times, Tinker, Scoville and Fujishima:
The right of free expression is fundamental in a free society. Though a
student has this right, it must be exercised in a responsible manner so as
not to interfere with the rights of other members of the school commu7
nity or to disrupt the educational process. 0

B.

FirstAmendment Rights of Students (Continued):
Hair and Dress Codes

Under the general provisions of chapter 122, sections 10-20.5
(duty of board to adopt and enforce necessary rules), 10-22.6
(power of board to suspend and expel) and 24-24 (maintenance
of discipline), school board members appear to be authorized to
make rules governing student appearance. It is never clear what
qualifies the board members to serve as arbiters of public taste. Consequently, an extraordinarily large number of suspensions and expulsions result from the subject of student dress-a subject unworthy of the amount of time and ink it traditionally commands,
and a grossly insufficient reason for removing a student from his
classroom or athletic squad. The most frequently litigated problem
in the area of student appearance concerns school board policies
regulating the hair length of male students. Illinois courts, as well
as federal courts of the Seventh Circuit, limit the authority of school
boards to regulate hair length to instances where such a regulatory
policy can be justified as necessary to the proper operation of a
school.
In Laine v. Dittman7 the Second District Appellate Court reviewed
a suspension of a high school student for noncompliance with the
69. OSPI CIRCULAR SERIES A, ch. XI
52-55 (1973).
70. Id. at 54.
71.

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, §

125 Ill. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d 824 (1970).

11-1 at
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school's grooming code. School officials claimed suspension was
necessary to preserve order in the school.7 2 The court, however,
saw no substantial disturbance in the operation of the school resulting
from the suspended student's hair style.7 3 Referring again to the
forecast rule of Tinker and the language to the effect that the exercise of freedom often results in hazard, the appellate court entered
the potentially revolutionary ruling that minor disturbances are not
sufficient to justify abridgement of a student's right to wear his hair
in a manner prohibited by a school grooming code. 74 The case is
revolutionary because it hints that the proper application of the
Tinker test is an objective one-according to an outside judicial perspective. Thus Laine may require that the determination of
whether student conduct is likely to substantially disrupt the educational process must be made objectively, not by an excitable dean of
discipline.
The Seventh Circuit declares its tonsorial views in Breen v. Kahl.7"
A student's right to wear hair in a particular manner is an ingredient
of personal freedom protected by the Constitution and applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. School officials who seek to regulate that freedom bear a
substantial burden of justification. The doctrine of in loco parentis
cannot, standing alone, justify punishing a student in violation of a
hair grooming code. A subsequent Seventh Circuit case, Crews v.
Cloncs,6 lengthens the Breen rule. School board hair length regulations must be specific to the problems created by long hair and
may be no broader than actually necessary. If disturbances occur
as a result of the presence of a long-haired student, school officials
may not take action against the long-haired student if they have not
attempted to restrain those students actually creating the disturbances. Health and safety aspects of hair length regulations must
apply to both male and female students. Thus, school officials in
the Seventh Circuit are considerably limited in the manner in which
they may regulate student hair lengths.7 7 The Seventh Circuit views
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 139, 259 N.E.2d at 825.
Id. at 142, 259 N.E.2d at 827.
125 IM.App. 2d at 143, 259 N.E.2d at 827.
419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
Subsequent to Breen but prior to Crews, the District Court for the Northern
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choice of hair style as a fundamental right and due process requires
that restrictions upon the exercise of that right be supported by some
compelling governmental interest.78
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the student hair length problem
has been shared by other circuits. In Bishop v. Colaw79 the Eighth
Circuit defined the liberty to control personal appearance as ranking
high on the spectrum of social values and held that regulations of
that liberty must be shown to be necessary. 80 The Third Circuit
in Stull v. School Board"' ruled that personal choice of hair style is
implicit in the liberty assurance of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and, absent a showing that hair length
caused a disruption, created a hazard, or affected academic accomplishment, school board regulation of student hair style violates due
process.82 Tht Fourth Circuit struck down "guidelines" for student
hair length in Massie v. Henry"3 stating that the right of a student to
choose his hair style was an aspect of the right to be secure in one's
person guaranteed by the due process clause and, absent a showing
of justification, the "guidelines" would not be permitted. 4 A somewhat less stringent justification test was proposed in the First Circuit. In Richards v. Thurston,8 the court found that the suspension
of a student for failing to cut his hair violated the student's liberty
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 6 A restriction of such a guaranteed liberty could be upheld
District of Illinois upheld a school board regulation of hair length where the regulation was seen as non-discriminatory on its face and in its enforcement and where
no restriction on freedom of expression resulted from enforcement. Livingston v.
Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I11. 1970).

Livingston seems almost indistinguish-

able from an earlier case in the district, which struck down nearly the same regulation.

Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. II1. 1969).

78.
79.

Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).

80.

Id. at 1075.

81.

459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972).

82.
83.

Id. at 347.
455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972).

84.

Id. at 783.

A showing that violence was threatened was not sufficient

justification where there was no evidence that disrupters could not be effectively
disciplined. See also Rumler v. Bd. of School Trustees, 437 F.2d 953 (4th Cir.
1971).
85. 425 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
86. ld. at 1284-85.
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only if the state's countervailing interest was either "self-evident or
. . . affirmatively shown.""
While the substantive due process argument has been successful

in defeating hair length regulations in many circuits, it has received
a different interpretation in others.

The Tenth Circuit rejected the

contention that substantive due process applies to student hair
length regulation.

In Freeman v. Flake"8 the Tenth Circuit

held that high school hair regulation cases "are not cognizable in
federal courts."

9

The Fifth Circuit in Karr v. Schmidt" rejected the

concept that choice of hair style is a fundamental right.9

Hence,

only a minimum test of rationality was to be applied in determining
the due process implications of a hair grooming regulation. 2 The
Fifth Circuit went on to add that in the future constitutional challenges to student hair length regulations were to be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 93 Similarly, the Sixth94 and Ninth9 5 Circuits have not applied substantive
due process tests to public school hair regulations.
There has been considerable variety in the constitutional challenges to hair length regulations; freedom of speech,9 6 privacy," and
87. Id. at 1286.
88. 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
89. Id. at 261.
90. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).
91. Id. at 615.
92. Id. at 616-17.
93. Id. at 618. The issue of student hair length regulation has obviously
troubled the Fifth Circuit. Prior to Karr, the Fifth Circuit held that the touchstone
for sustaining hair length regulations was the demonstration that such regulations
"are necessary to alleviate interference with the educational process." Griffin v.
Tatum, 425 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1970). Shortly after Griffin, the Fifth Circuit
upheld a school grooming code on the grounds that the rule was founded on a rational basis. Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). In Karr, the Fifth Circuit adopted still another
view-those challenging hair length regulations have the burden of showing the
regulation to be wholly arbitrary. 460 F.2d at 617. The Karr rule was, however,
not held applicable to college campuses and the Fifth Circuit refused to extend the
per se rule of Karr to a public junior college regulation of student hair style.
Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972).
94. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970).
95. King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied sub nom., Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042
(1972).
96. Courts have held that hair length lacked communicative value or that long
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equal protection98 issues have been raised but have had little success. The courts have usually resolved hair length cases through a
due process analysis. The gradual acceptance of long-haired males
in society may, however, already have precluded further development of due process or other arguments against the imposition of

regulation of student hair length. 9
Finally, with the sole exception of the probably defunct Livingston
v. Swanquist decision, 10 0 no cases have come to this writer's attention where the male hair length regulation was challenged as being

repressive legislation serving no compelling state interest and which
prima facie violates equal protection solely on the basis of sex. Some
Illinois courts may be receptive to a challenge on these grounds, particularly since the recent Cook County Circuit Court decision striking
down the Chicago transvestite ordinance 1' on equal protection
grounds.
C.

Due ProcessRights of Students: Proceedingsto Suspend or Expel

It is settled law and fashionable for courts to restate the proposition that school expulsion proceedings need not provide all the trappings of due process essential to a criminal or judicial trial'012 behaired students had no intent to communicate. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609,
614 (5th Cir. 1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445
F.2d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970).
97. Courts have held privacy arguments inapplicable to hair length regulations.
See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448
F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1942 (1972).
98. There is considerable division in the treatment of equal protection arguments. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); Massie v. Henry,
455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1971); Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Livingston v.
Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Il1. 1970); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
JU1.
1969).
99. For a recent discussion of comparative merits of the various constitutional
challenges to hair length regulations, see 47 TUL. L. REv. 407 (1973).
100. 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
101. Mun. Code of Chicago, § 192-8 (1972). City of Chicago v. Meldros,
Williams, et al., Nos. 73-H-262784, 262785, 262787, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Municipal Dep't, First District, reset before Judge Jack Sperling, December 7, 1973.
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cause of an implicit assumption that the possible sanction is not as
damaging as a criminal or juvenile conviction. The courts, however, never examine the assumption.
While no thorough statistical study exists, many observers are of
the opinion that an expulsion from high school is a considerably
greater handicap than a juvenile or misdemeanor conviction. It is
speculated that a student who is suspended or expelled finds his or
her chance of graduating reduced by a half or more, and students
lacking a high school diploma labor under a lifelong economic and
social disability. A lesser criminal conviction has a way of fading
into the background of youthful indiscretion; lack of a diploma creates
a lifelong stigma. Furthermore, certain students who are expelled
fare far worse than others since not all school districts provide for
alternative education, even though the Code apparently so requires
such provision according to the following analysis.
The new Illinois Constitution provides that: "A fundamental goal
of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.' ' 3 The Code provides that
local school boards have a duty "to establish and keep in operation
in each year during a school term of at least the minimum length
*

. .

a sufficient number of free schools for the accommodation of all

persons in the district over the age of 6 and under 21 years, and
to secure for all such persons the right and opportunity to an equal
education ....

."101

The Special Education Article defines "Mal-

adjusted Children" as "children between the ages of 3 and 21 years
who because of social or emotional problems are unable to make constructive use of their school experience and require the provision of
special services designed to promote their educational growth and
development."' 5
The suspension and expulsion statute provides in part that "[tihe
Department of Mental Health shall be invited to send a representative to consult with the board at [a meeting to consider disciplining
a student] whenever there is evidence that mental illness may be
102. See, e.g., Betts v. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972) and
cases cited therein.
103. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.12 (1971) (emphasis added).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.03 (1971).
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the cause of expulsion or suspension.' ' 106 The definitions of "mentally ill" and "maladjusted" child appear to overlap. Furthermore
the Superintendent of Public Instruction in his Program for evaluating all Illinois schools, declares that:
No child, whether disruptive to a school system or not, should be deprived
of an education. These children who cannot function in the traditional
107
school setting should have access to alternative programs of instruction.

Finally, any adult who wilfully seeks to interfere with or prevent the
daily attendance of a citizen under 16 may be an accessory or conspirator to the crime of truancy.'
These pronouncements, read together, would seem to make it
impossible for an Illinois student to be expelled outright, that is, to
have his right to an appropriate education at public expense withdrawn. Several school boards have recognized this and provide a
range of alternatives, including night or early morning classes, co-op
credit, home study, and transfer to another school or district with a
comity arrangement. No thorough list of the types of alternatives
now available or the districts offering them exists, though there were
rumors to the effect that Cook County Educational Service Region
(ESR) Superintendent, Richard J. Martwick, was compiling one.
Expelled students and their attorneys should demand alternative education in all cases. To the extent they are denied, while other districts continue to service their expelled students, they may find a
remedy under the equal protection clause.
Little information about student disciplinary action is currently
available. While each local board's minutes probably reflect suspensions and expulsions, the statistics are not centrally collected in
any useful form, despite the clear duty of the Superintendent of the
ESR's to keep such records.' 0 9
Wholly outside the official school discipline system is the "pushout" phenomenon. A student who is regarded as a troublemaker is
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(d) (Supp. 1972). To date no student
has ever invited a DMH representative to his expulsion proceeding on the theory
that there is evidence that the cause for the expulsion or suspension is the mental
illness of the school administrators or board members.
107. ILLINOIS PROGRAM FOR THE EVALUATION, SUPERVISION AND RECOGNITION OF
SCHooLS, OSPI CIRCULAR SERIES A, CH. XI RIGHTS AND RESPONSrBLITIES, § 11-1
at 54 (1973).
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 22-1 to 22-11 (Supp. 1972).
109. ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 122, §§ 3-14.2, 3-14.11, 3-15.11 (1971).
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slated for a "parent conference" or "staffing." At the meeting the
superintendent, dean of discipline, psychologist, and a teacher or two
confront the student and his parents and in effect say: "Ok, do you
want to walk out, or do we have to throw you out?" Unfortunately,
the predictable result usually occurs. It is much easier and less expensive than a full due process hearing. In fact, if this procedure
fails the school may contend the meeting was the hearing. Students
faced with this situation should challenge the school's proceeding,
appearing with parents and an attorney if possible. The student
should charge the school with violating the provision of the Illinois
School Code dealing with the right to a full due process hearing.
Such a ploy is attempted when a student has a series of minor rule
infractions making him or her a nettlesome administrative problem, although no single provable act of "gross disobedience or misconduct" is present to serve as the basis for a "legal" expulsion. 110
In the course of the writer's experience defending many expulsion
cases the following personal observations have emerged:
1. School discipline proceedings are kangaroo courts where
the word of an adult is truth, the word of a teenager a
lie, and the judgment of the hearing officer often dictated by the administration or board. Often the hearing officer is a teacher, or worse, an attorney generally
retained by the board to advise it on, inter alia, how to
expel students fairly and permanently.
2. The discipline process is unconcerned with the interests or even the rights (except to avoid litigation) of
the student facing discipline. Collectively, the discipline laws and regulations are a surgical tool to excise
a difficult administrative problem.
3. All disciplinary infractions must be violations of either
one of two categories of rules: (a) rules designed to
protect the health and safety of persons and to protect the educational process to the extent objectively
necessary, for example, rules against battery, theft,
carrying weapons, drug abuse, and generally those acts
whose proscriptions are found in the criminal code; (b)
110.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6 (Supp. 1972).
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rules designed to serve the convenience, prejudice, or
whim of the school administration, for example, rules
against talking in halls, wearing long hair, posting
notices without prior approval, using vulgar language,
holding hands, etc. The majority of disciplinary actions
are occasioned by violations of the second type of
rule. Furthermore, the tone of a school's disciplinary
atmosphere and number of disciplinary transactions
is entirely in the control of the school, not the students.
There are many hopelessly porcine school administrators who positively invite "inappropriate" behavior. 11 '
4. Most school board members make (or rubber-stamp)
disciplinary decisions to suspend and particularly to expel with a rather self-satisfied relief that they have
done their employees a service by removing a difficult problem from the school. They refuse to consider
the damage or potential damage sustained by the expellee, whose chances of return and graduation may
be reduced by 50 to 75 per cent. The difference in
lifetime income between the graduate and expellee
is never considered in a discipline vote. The rhetoric
is usually quite the opposite: by ridding the school of
a "troublemaker" the board not only is protecting
the right to education of the students still in school,
but also is helping the malefactor-doing it for his
own good. An understanding of the operation of this
principle has always escaped this writer: how can
truncating the student's education advance his educa112
tional interests?
The above generalizations may seem overdrawn. In defense it is proposed that there are perhaps only two dozen Illinois lawyers who
have defended expulsion actions before school boards. A dozen
111. The writer, who is a teacher, met several of these individuals when invited to speak to a meeting of high school disciplinarians. When he tried to make
these same observations several of the deans suddenly advanced down the aisle and
attempted to remove him forcibly from the room. Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 23,
1973, at 14, col. 1.
112. This question has been approached in a song by Pete Seeger, The Grateful
Folks o1 Ben Tre (1970).
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of them were consulted on the above observations.
ment is unanimous.

Their agree-

Practitioners who appear on student's behalf before school boards
and their hearing officers should be apprised of the attitudes which
lurk there. The legislature in its wisdom has thrice insulated school
board members from suit for any action taken in disciplinary matters.

113

Students and their lawyers who seek review of a school board
decision to suspend or expel will find the scope of review extremely
narrow and the road arduous. The School Code is not subject to
the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. 114 The prescribed
mode of resolving controversies arising under the Code, that is, review by the Superintendent of the Educational Service Region, chapter 122, section 3-10, and appeal to the State Superintendent, chapter 122, section 2-3.8, has so far been closed by administrative fiat
to students seeking review of an expulsion. The Superintendents of
the ESRs and the OSPI either simply ignore students' petitions for
review of a controversy arising from an expulsion, or declare the
curious principle that a contested expulsion is not a controversy
arising under the School Code. Neither an appellate court nor the
Attorney General has yet expressed an opinion.
There remain two alternatives. First is a federal civil rights action under section 1983,"1 if there is a fairly flagrant violation of
a federal right such as due process (expulsion with no hearing at
all)116 or freedom of expression (expulsion for peaceful distribution
of an underground newspaper). 117 When brought, these actions
often succeed. However, Illinois school boards, particularly those
in Chicago and areas where legal aid lawyers are located, have been
well educated in due process rights and, to a lesser degree, first
amendment rights. The student who has a due process hearing and
113. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(a), (b), (c) (Supp. 1972).
text at note 121, infra.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, H9 264-69 (1971).

See

115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
116. Mayo v. Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 70-2323 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 29, 1970);
Black v. Holt, Civil No. 71-287 (N.D. Ill., filed Jan. 27, 1971).
117. Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Scoville v. Bd.
of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).

426

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:402

is then expelled on incompetent or false testimony or erroneous
judgment by a hearing officer often has no federal remedy.
The second way to get review of an expulsion is to file a petition
for common law administrative review in the state courts. The student must ask the circuit court for what is in effect a writ of certiorari to the board which expelled him."' The grounds for such a
petition to be sustained-for a writ to issue-are quite narrow:
there must be a showing of clear error on the face of the decision.
The court will not review or rehear the evidence of gross disobedience or misconduct heard by the board. In the rare case where the
record is void of any evidence to sustain the expulsion, the court
may order the student returned to school." 19
In the entire student rights area there are only a few trial court
decisions and virtually no case law outside the federal reports. One
explanation is that high school students facing expulsion do not
hire lawyers, and those who do will probably never get to court.
This last point needs emphasis. Despite the lopsided state of the
law and the realities of the power relationships, the appearance of
prepared counsel at an expulsion proceeding is a fearsome and formidable bargaining point with all but the most experienced school
boards. Board members and district superintendents are terrified
of lawsuits, and are often willing to effect a compromise. 2 ° Dell 8.
(1963);
(1959);
119.

See Bruce v. Dep't of Registration and Educ., 26 Ill. 2d 612, 187 N.E.2d 711
Fenyes v. State Employees' Retirement Sys., 17 Ill. 2d 106, 160 N.E.2d 810
Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 I11.257, 133 N.E. 649 (1922).
Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 71 L 14865 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1971).
The

court issued a preliminary injunction on November 23, 1971.
120. A graphic description of this fear appears in an oft quoted, widely distributed article by George Trietzenberg, now Superintendent of Cook County High
School District 218, wherein he cautions against "pushing the panic button" when
faced with the Constitution. The article, "How to Live with Due Process," wel-

comed as a tour de force by administrators beleaguered by the Constitution, has
the following synopsis:
Within the last decade high school students have gained the same legal
prerogatives enjoyed by any citizen under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.

Principals have been slow to adapt to the change.

Some

fear that it will destroy their ability to maintain necessary discipline. Such

is not necessarily the case, says Mr. Trietzenberg. He lists pitfalls to guard
against if the administrator's prerogatives are to be preserved.
See Trietzenberg, How to Live with Due Process, 55 BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL
AssociATIoN OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, No. 352 at 61-68 (February 1971).
In an exercise of chillingly efficient legal service to school administrators, one
Chicago law firm has prepared a kit of all the legal forms and procedures calcu-
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spite the attempts to insulate the boards from lawsuits, there remains an ample quiver of attacks yet to be unleashed by imaginative
advocates and their student clients.

What follows is a description of

the present, still largely unchallenged, shoddy expulsion system.
The Code authorizes Illinois school boards to suspend or expel
students guilty of "gross disobedience or misconduct."''
The law
lated to result in an expulsion which will be airtight against due process attacks.
See materials prepared by Scariano & Gubbins, June 1, 1973.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(a)(b)(c) (Supp. 1972), reads:
Suspension or expulsion of pupils. (a) To expel pupils guilty of gross
disobedience or misconduct, and no action shall lie against them for such
expulsion. Expulsion shall take place only after the parents have been
requested to appear at a meeting of the board, or with a hearing officer
appointed by it, to discuss their child's behavior. Such request shall be
made by registered or certified mail and shall state the time, place and
purpose of the meeting. The board, or a hearing officer appointed by it,
at such meeting shall state the reasons for dismissal and the date on
which the expulsion is to become effective. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he shall report to the board a written summary of
the evidence heard at the meeting and the board may take such action
thereon as it finds appropriate.
(b) To suspend or by regulation to authorize the superintendent of the
district or the principal or dean of students of any school to suspend
pupils guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct and no action shall lie
against them for such suspension. The board may by regulation authorize
the superintendent of the district or the principal of any school to suspend
pupils guilty of such acts for a period not to exceed 10 school days. Any
such suspension shall be reported immediately to the parents or guardian
of such pupil along with a full statement of the reasons for such suspension and a notice of their right to a review, a copy of which shall be
given to the school board. Upon request of the parents or guardian the
school board or a hearing officer appointed by it shall review such action
of the superintendent or principal. At such review the parents or guardian of the pupil may appear and discuss the suspension with the board or
its hearing officer. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he
shall report to the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the
meeting. After its hearing or upon receipt of the written report of its
hearing officer, the board may take such action as it finds appropriate.
(c)
To suspend or by regulation to authorize the superintendent of the
district or the principal of any school to suspend pupils guilty of gross
disobedience or misconduct on the school bus from riding the school bus
and no action shall lie against them for such suspension. Such suspension
shall continue until it has been reviewed by the school board, or a hearing
officer appointed by it. At such review the parents or guardian of the
child may appear and discuss such suspension with the board or its hearing
officer. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he shall report
to the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the meeting.
The board may take such action thereon as it finds appropriate upon the
board's hearing or the written report of its hearing officer.
(d) The Department of Mental Health shall be invited to send a rep-
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relating to expulsion theoretically requires that the parents of a
student be requested to meet with the school board or a hearing officer appointed by the board to discuss the student's behavior. At
the meeting the parents will be told of the reasons for expulsion and
the date on which expulsion is to take place. Suspension procedures
are specified in greater detail in the statute than are expulsion procedures. Students guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct may
be suspended by a district superintendent, a principal, or a dean of
students for a period not to exceed ten days.
Theoretically, parents of a suspended student must be immediately
notified of the suspension, the reasons supporting the action, and
their right to a review of the suspending official's actions before the
school board or a hearing officer appointed by the board. After
such a review, the board may take whatever action regarding the
suspension it considers appropriate. In fact, the hearing officer's report may not have been given to the parents and their attorney until
the school board meeting, after the meeting, or ever. While no appellate court has held this failure to be a fatal defect in the due process requirement, practitioners faced with this situation should vigorously argue for, and may get, a postponement of the case until another school board meeting. This postponement provides the practitioner with an opportunity to review and a chance to rebut or discredit a hearing officer's adverse report-a leap in judgment most
boards are incapable of making since they are predisposed to expel.
Secondly, it allows the errant student to spend another two weeks or
a month pursuing his or her studies even further into the semester.
There is no question that school boards have the authority to suspend or expel students. 1 22 The state has, however, not seen fit to
describe in detail the procedures by which students are to be expelled or suspended. Given such latitude, local school boards may
and do adopt procedures that do not satisfy the due process requirements set down by the federal courts. Recently, the Illinois
statute and the expulsion procedures of a local school board were
resentative to consult with the board at such meeting whenever there is
evidence that mental illness may be the cause for expulsion or suspension.
122. Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970); Whitfield v.
Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D. I11. 1970); Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 182 111.
App. 342, 346 (1913).
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unsuccessfully challenged in three separate cases. 121 In Linwood
an expelled student maintained that the terminology "gross disobedience and misconduct" was too vague to satisfy constitutional due

process standards. The Seventh Circuit held that the terms "gross
disobedience and misconduct" were permissible when the terms served
as a basis for a more specific definition of proscribed conduct by the
local school board. 124 The student went on to challenge the constitutional sufficiency of the procedures used in his expulsion. The
Peoria Board, however, had provided a detailed scheme of expul-

sion procedures, which included
timely and adequate notice of the charges, with a reasonable opportunity to
prepare for and meet them; an orderly hearing in keeping with the nature
of the subject matter involved; the right to be represented by counsel, to call
and examine witnesses, to cross-examine the opposing witnesses; and consideration of the evidence by an impartial tribunal with action based
125
thereon.

The student did not receive, but claimed a right to
a public hearing; appointment of counsel at public expense; process to compel the attendance of witnesses; proof of the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt; . . . a unanimous decision . . . a hearing under procedures which

include rules providing that the student is to be furnished within a reasonable
time prior to the hearing with a list of the names and addresses of the
witnesses who are to testify, and information with respect to the testimony
each will give; providing that the hearing is to be conducted by a panel of
impartial persons other than the board members, each of whom will be
present during all the testimony; and requiring that the decision is to be
,made in the form of a written opinion incorporating findings of fact upon
126
which it is based.

Since, as the Linwood court stated, "due process in the context here
involved is not to be equated . . . with that essential to a criminal
trial or juvenile court delinquency proceeding" 127 the expelled stu123. Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972); McGee v. Bd. of
Educ., Civil No. 71-2030 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (dismissed without opinion); Whitfield
v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Ill. 1970).
124. 463 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1972). The court, by a feat of logic peculiar
to appellate tribunals, distinguished Linwood from its prior decision in Soglin v.
Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) wherein it had declared the University
of Wisconsin disciplinary rule which proscribed "misconduct" by students as vague
and overbroad and in violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights. 463 F.2d
at 767. The successful plaintiff in Soglin not only remained in school, but was
elected mayor of Madison, Wisconsin in 1972.
125. 463 F.2d at 770.
126. Id.
127. Id. See also Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
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dent could not claim, under due process, that the procedure used in
28
his expulsion was unconstitutional.1

The Chicago Board of Education's approach to the questions of
student discipline and due process differs in at least two respects
from those taken by other Illinois boards. First, Chicago public
school administrators faced with a discipline problem have a number
of options unavailable to the enforcers of acceptable behavior in
smaller districts. Errant Chicago students can be sent initally to
"social adjustment" classes within the same school, then to a tougher
social adjustment classroom in another nearby school. From there
he may go to a "continuation school" and finally to a residential
school (in reality, a jail) and always remain a student of the Chicago
129
school district.

Secondly, the Chicago Board of Education is the subject of a
special article in the School Code, chapter 122, section 34-1 et seq.
which grants certain powers exclusively in the Chicago Board. Included in these specially listed powers is the authority to establish
rules and regulations which have the force of ordinances, for the
proper maintenance of a uniform system of discipline for both employees and pupils, chapter 122, section 34-19. This authority has
been exercised and the Board has promulgated and published its
Rules.' 3 ' Contained therein are Regulations 6.8 and 6.9 which respectively provide for the expulsion and suspension of Chicago Public School students. These Regulations make no reference to the
statute which prescribes the due process to be followed in suspension
and expulsion proceedings' and make no provisions to secure the
student's right to constitutional due process. Section 6-8 authorizes
expulsion upon a finding that a student is a distinct detrimental influence or unable to profit from further school experience. Section 6.9 authorizes suspension of a student for less than one month
for gross disobedience or misconduct."'
Notwithstanding the
128.
129.
1972).

130.

Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 34-117 to 34-129 (1971), as amended, (Supp.
RULES OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO

(1972).

131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6 (Supp. 1972).
132. RULES OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 6.9
(1972).
Expulsions of Pupils-Cause. Whenever a pupil in any school is found by

the school authorities to be a distinct detrimental influence to the conduct
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political realities, the Code did not envision that the Chicago Board
could operate wholly within an article 34 vacuum, with no reference
whatsoever to the balance of the laws governing Illinois schools. The
last paragraph of section 34-18, which sets out the Chicago Board's
duties, tentatively acknowledges that
[tihe specifications of the powers herein granted are not to be construed as
exclusive, but the board shall also exercise all other powers that may be
requisite or proper for the maintenance and the development of a public
school system, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code which apply
33
to all school districts.'

A reasonable interpretation would be that the Chicago Board cannot
pass rules which are inconsistent with or in derogation of the law.
The Chicago Rules (except for the 30-day suspension, unknown in
the Code proper) might be salvaged if the "protections" of the Code
were implemented. Such is not the case. In many cases the Chicago Board expels or transfers with no notice or hearing whatsoever.
Unfortunately, the one challenge to the Chicago scheme which
has been completed did not reach either the statutory interpretation
question or the obvious equal protection challenge arising from the
different treatment of Chicago students. In Betts v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,"4 Goldie Betts, a student, admitted
misconduct to a school official. At a subsequent meeting, Betts'
mother was told by two school officials that Goldie was to be transferred to a continuation school-an action tantamount to expulsion.
On appeal, Ms. Betts raised the equal protection argument for the
first time contending that the procedural safeguards afforded her
were not comparable to those required by Illinois statutes in areas
of the school, or to be unable to profit or benefit from further experience

in his school, he may be transferred to special educational facilities in the
school system or may be excused from further attendance, or excluded from
school by the General Superintendent of Schools.
Id. § 6.8.

Suspension of Pupils-Cause.

For gross disobedience or misconduct a

pupil may be suspended temporarily by the principal for a period not
exceeding one school month for each offense. Every such suspension shall
be reported immediately to the District Superintendent and also to the
parent or guardian of the pupil, with a full statement of the reasons for

such suspension. The District Superintendent shall have authority to review the action of the principal and to return the suspended pupil.
Id. § 6.9.
133. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18 (1971).
134.

466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972).
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other than Chicago. The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argument
on the technical grounds that she had failed to raise it at trial and
it was dehors the record on appeal, but noted that upon remand the
district court could entertain such an argument if the disparity in
treatment of students threatened with expulsion could not be reasonably related to some legitimate state goal.
Betts further argued that her treatment did not accord with procedural due process. The Court reasoned that since Ms. Betts had
admitted to conduct which was gross by any standard (turning in a
series of false alarms), the Rules as applied to her case were not
unconstitutional on due process grounds. Thus, a full hearing on
her guilt or innocence was not essential. An opportunity to present
a mitigative argument was required, but the meeting between Ms.
Betts' mother and school officials should have been sufficient for this
18 5
purpose.
On remand to the district court, Judge Julius Hoffman presiding,
the Betts case was compromised and no final opinion issued. The
case raises more questions than it settles, and there are numerous,
yet untried, attacks on the Chicago Board of Education's discipline
rules. The chilling Kafkaesque language of Rule 6-8 which describes a student "to be a distinct detrimental influence to the conduct of the school, or to be unable to profit or benefit from further
experience in his school" fairly cries out for challenge. 8"
The Chicago Parental Schools, which are effectively maximum
security prisons to which serious truants are summarily committed
for twelve week sentences at Thursday "hearings" in the Cook County
Juvenile Court, are likely to be torpedoed pursuant to recent legislation calling for their re-evaluation. 8 7
135. Id. at 633-34. The court also denied claims that compulsory education
laws forbid expulsion, and that unemployed students could not be assigned to
continuation schools.
136. One such challenge is the case of Zehowicz v. Bakalis, 73 Ch. 3266 is
now pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, County Dept., Chancery Division. See also P.U.S.H. v. Carey, 73 C 2522 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 2, 1973).
137. ILL. REV. STAT ch 122, § 34-117 (Supp. 1972), amending ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 122, § 34-117 (1971) to read: 'There may be established and maintained
one or more parental or truant schools .... ." The former language was "[t]here
shall be...." Subsequent sections of this law established a citizen evaluation committee to review the schools, their concept and utility and report to the legislature
by early 1974. Administrators hint that the schools may be phased out. At the
moment a contract for their operation has been let to Northern Illinois University,

1973]

433

SCHOOL LAW

Regarding the general state of the Illinois law of school suspensions and expulsions, the Seventh Circuit has not yet fully defined

the specific characteristics of expulsion or suspension procedure that
satisfy procedural due process.

Expulsion or suspension procedures

need not be as formal as those involved in criminal determinations.
Some opportunity for hearings upon factual matters and upon arguments in mitigation of punishment are required. While procedures
in various school districts may vary, some attention must be given
to equal protection aspects of disparate treatment.1

8

The law re-

mains confusing, stacked against the student, and largely irrational,
but still conducive to creative manipulation by advocates who seek
to vindicate the right of every student to a free public education.

The hearings are too often a sham, but the possibility exists for
some objective judgment by the hearing officer if he is unrelated to
and insulated from the expelling board. The office of the Cook

County ESR from time to time provides hearing officers for suspension and expulsion proceedings. Practitioners whose clients have
received notices of expulsion should try vigorously to arrange for
the participation of a hearing officer from this source. In the event
of a loss, alternative educational services should be demanded and

somehow extracted from the victors.
which presumably has some special expertise in an approach to the problem of
truancy. The University also needs the use of the CPS parking lot.
138. Some attention should be given to procedural due process criteria being
developed in other jurisdictions. On the nature of the notice of hearing given to
the student or parent, see Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Jones v. State Bd. of
Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), afl'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969);
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd,
415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Hammond v.
South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Perlman v. Bd. of
Trustees, 9 Cal. App. 3d, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970); Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn.
99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); Texarkana Independent School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1971). On
the nature of the hearing required in expulsion or suspension actions, see
2Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F.
Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va.
1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), afrd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Perlman v. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1970); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); The 9th Circuit has retreated;
Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. Sept. 25,
1973).
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The very existence of a phenomenon so nihilistic as outright expulsion from the only public schools available in a society committed
to universal free education and the compulsory partaking thereof, is
symptomatic of the hypocrisy rampant in public institutions generally. High school students perceive it but, in their youth, fail to understand it. Their naivete is shared.
III.

THE RIGHTS OF ILLINOIS EDUCATORS

Institutional infringements on the constitutional rights of free expression and due process are not directed solely at students. School
teachers, and more recently Illinois school administrators, have stirred
up a spate of cases which continue to cause school board members
to pine for the good old days when adhesion contracts could be relied
upon to withstand the tinkering of the constitutionalists.
This section considers certain rights of educators guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression. There follows a brief consideration of the expanded, but not yet congruent, rights of administrators. Some questions concerning educators' right to organize and
18 9
strike are considered elsewhere in this Survey.
Most of the activity in state and federal courts regarding teachers'
rights upon termination 4 ' fall into two main categories: cases concerning the reasons for the termination, asking whether there was
a nexus of causation between the termination and the exercise of
rights protected by the first amendment, and cases concerning
termination procedure asking whether the teacher was entitled to a
hearing under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
itself, despite the failure of the statute to grant such a right. While
litigation concerning the reasons for termination would appear to affect tenured and nontenured teachers nearly equally, litigation concerning procedural due process affects nontenured teachers almost
exclusively. 4 ' Not surprisingly, most suits of the second type have
139. See Goldstein, Labor Law, 1972-73 Survey of Illinois Law, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 382 (1973).
140. As used here, "termination" includes both dismissals during a school term
and a failure to renew the teaching contract for the following term.

141.

Like most states, Illinois accords greater procedural protection to tenured

teachers than to their nontenured counterparts.

11, 24-12 (1971).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-
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been brought by nontenured teachers, though a second factor
comes into play. School boards can weed out the mavericks during
a new teacher's probation period. For any given year there are probably fewer disgruntled terminations among the army of tenured
teachers then among the current crop of first or second year recruits.
A.

Termination Procedures: Due ProcessRights'4 2

The Illinois School Code provides that a tenured teacher has the
right to a public hearing to be held before the effective dismissal
date, to be present with counsel, to cross-examine witnesses and to
offer evidence and witnesses in his own behalf.' 43 The hearing
is a substantial right and must be fair in all respects."' Once a
teacher is tenured, a termination in the form of a dismissal during the
school term or a failure to renew his contract for the following term,
does not preclude the teacher from asserting his right to a statement
of reasons and a hearing. No such rights are accorded to nontenured
teachers by statute in Illinois, 1'" though cautious employers may
begin to compile a dossier on new teachers unlikely to be renewed
in order to preserve the record. While the written reasons may not
be served in all cases, they tend to materialize with an alacrity which
is amazing by normal bureaucratic standards, in the face of the new
teacher's allegation that the nonrenewal is for thought-crime or speechcrime. If the proper provocative action is taken by the teacher or
counsel, some kind of written reasons will almost always issue, the
statute notwithstanding.
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided four
cases which dealt with the rights of nontenured teachers to receive
142. For a full discussion of this subject, see Kallin, The Roth Decision: Does
the Nontenured Teacher Have A Constitutional Right to A Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL. B. J. 464 (1973).

143.

The rules are set out in two long sections of the Code: ILL.

ch. 122, §§ 24-11, 24-12 (1971).

REV. STAr.

According to section 24-11

a tenured teacher is one who has been employed in any district as a full
time teacher for a probationary period of two consecutive school terms.
The board may extend the probationary period for one additional school
term if the teacher did not have one school term of fuU-time teaching experience prior to the beginning of the probationary period. A nontenured teacher is one who has not met these requirements.
144. Miller v. Bd. of Educ., 37 111. App. 2d 451, 186 N.E.2d 790 (1962).
145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1971).
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a statement of reasons and a hearing. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 14 6

the Court faced the procedural issues squarely. "The only question
presented to us at this stage in the case is whether the respondent
had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a hearing on

the university's decision not to rehire him for another year."' 47 Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, noted that under both Wisconsin law 48 and terms of his contract, Roth secured his interest in
employment for one year and nothing more. Therefore, unless Roth
could show that the Board's decision not to rehire him deprived him
of "liberty" or "property" he was not entitled to a statement of rea-

sons or a hearing under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
liberty:

The nonrenewal did not constitute a deprivation of

The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in
the community ...
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ
the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed
his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities ...
Had it done so, this, again, would be a different case. .... 149

Nor did it constitute a deprivation of property:
Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution ...

[Tihe respondent's "property" interest in employment at Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms of his appointment ...
They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment.1 50

The Court rendered three other decisions on the same day as Roth:
Perry v. Sindermann,"' Orr v. Trinter"5 and Shirck v. Thomas."'

Sindermann dealt with teachers' rights in a state (Texas) which
does not provide a statutory tenure system.
146.
147.
148.
1973).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
(1972).

408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Id. at 569.
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (1967).

See Wis.

In Orr, the Court

STAT. ANN.

§ 37.31 (Supp.

408 U.S 564, 573-74 (1972).
Id. at 577-78.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 940
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denied certiorari from the Sixth Circuit's decision that a nontenured
teacher need not be given reasons or a hearing upon non-retention.
In Shirck the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration
in light of Roth, the Seventh Circuit's decision that a nontenured
teacher had a right to a bill of particulars and a hearing on non-retention.5 4 While the Court's decisions may seem dispositive of
the nontenured teachers' rights to a statement of reasons and a hearing, they raise some interesting questions for Illinois practitioners.
Under the School Code, 5' first year probationary teachers need not
be given reasons or a hearing upon nonrenewal. Second year probationary teachers, however, must be given a statement of reasons.
Thus a second year probationary teacher may be able to successfully argue that the tendered reasons engage a favored right, in that
they will "seriously damage his standing and associations in the
community" or "impose on him a stigma," and thus do not satisfy
the requirements for a hearing to afford him the opportunity to clear
his name. A number of cases decided since Roth have taken this
position.' 56
In one local case, Franz v. Board of Education,'1 7 the court held
that a nontenured teacher had stated a cause of action based on affidavits revealing that, after expending substantial efforts, the plaintiff
could not find another teaching job. In Hadjuk v. Vocational Technical and Adult Education District,'5 5 the court stated that the school

board would be compelled to provide a nontenured teacher with a
hearing where it notified the teacher of reasons for his non-retention, which suggested immorality or irresponsibility or amounted to
such a conclusive evaluation of the teacher's professional competence
as to injure his good name.

In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College

District, the Seventh Circuit, Judge Castle speaking for the major154. For a more detailed treatment of Roth, see Note, Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-The Rights of a Non-Tenured Teacher Upon Non-Renewal
of His Contract at a State School, 22 DEPAuL L. REV. 702 (1973), and Kallin,
supra, note 3.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1971).

156.

Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (a nontenured teacher

stated a cause of action when he alleged that the nonrenewal placed a stigma upon

him); Wilderman v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1972)
ployer's conduct was likely to impose a stigma).
157. Civil No. 72-151 (N.D. Ill., August 10, 1972).
158.

356 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1973).

(sufficient if em-
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ity, held that "[a] person is deprived of 'liberty' if the state damages
his standing in the community by charging him
with an unsavory
159
character trait such as dishonesty or immorality.'
Another question left unanswered by Roth is whether the school
board, which predictably agreed with the administration's recommendation to terminate, is sufficiently impartial to provide a fair hearing."' The court declined to face this issue although it was raised

by amici curiae briefs filed by both administrators and teachers. 161
The Seventh Circuit had stepped where the high court did not
tread and in two recent cases has held that nonrenewed educators

did in fact have a right to a hearing before an impartial decision maker.'" 2 A 1973 Second Circuit case, however, restated the oft-quoted

dictum that due process does not invariably require the procedural
safeguards accorded in a criminal proceeding.

Because due process

varies with the factual context of the case, absent a showing of actual,
rather than potential, bias, the school board will be considered to
be sufficiently impartial.' 63
Illinois elementary and secondary teachers narrowly missed gaining a legislative resolution of this issue. Both houses of the General
Assembly passed House Bill 311 which sought to amend sections
4-12 and 24-16 of the School Code to require that all teacher re-

moval or dismissal hearings be held before a disinterested hearing officer appointed and paid for by the Superintendent of Public In159. 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
160. Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d
1025 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 940 (1972) (teacher is
entitled to reasons and a hearing). Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971),
aff'd mem., 408 U.S. 943 (1972); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405
F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Parker v. Bd. of Educ.,
237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965)
(entitled to neither reasons nor hearing).
161. See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Finkin, Toward a
Law of Academic Freedom, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 575 (1973); Pettigrew, Constitutional
Tenure: Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 475
(1971); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAv. L. REV. 1045,
1065 (1968).
162. Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. IlL.
1972) (3-judge court, prob. juris. noted, sub nom., Phillips v. Kennedy, 411 U.S.
915 (1973).
163. Simard v. Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973).
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struction, not the local board, as envisioned by the present law. This

measure, like several other school bills which threatened to raise
the price, and perhaps the quality, of Illinois education a bit higher,
fell victim to Governor Daniel Walker's veto.
B.

Free Expression: The Teachers' Right to Criticize
and Keep Working

The School Code provides that teachers may be removed for

"cause."' 164 A full discussion of what constitutes cause is beyond

the scope of this article, but the school boards are accorded considerable latitude in their determinations. Courts are very hesitant to
overturn a board's decision. 6 5

Until the past decade, courts have generally held that public employment is a privilege rather than a right, and that the first amend-

ment rights of public employees must yield to accommodation when
overriding interests of public policy are at stake. 1 6 Courts tended
to weigh the public employer's interests much more heavily than the

public employee's first amendment rights. This policy was thoroughly modified when the United States Supreme Court in Keyishian
v. Board of Regents'6 7 flatly rejected the premise that public employment may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional
rights. In Pickering v. Board of Education'6 8 which the Seventh

Circuit considers to be the leading Supreme Court case on public
employees' constitutional rights, 6 9 the Court stated that
[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
164. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1971).
To dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or
other sufficient cause and . . . whenever, in its opinion, he is not qualified
to teach, or whenever . . . the interests of the schools require it...
Id.
165. Last v. Bd. of Educ., 37 Ill. App. 2d 159, 185 N.E.2d 282 (1962); Meredith v. Bd. of Educ., 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 5 (1955).
School board
decisions are not reviewable under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-79 (1971). Courts review school board decisions,
even those allegedly in violation of constitutional rights grudgingly and narrowly.
166. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
167. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
168. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
169. See Donahue v.Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 1972).
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the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
70
the public services it performs through its employees.'

Pickering held, and Perry v. Sindermann17 ' affirmed, that teachers
could not be terminated for exercising their first amendment rights.
The Court attempted to avoid formulating a Tinker-type test in
Pickering: "Because of the enormous variety of fact situations . . .
we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay
down a general standard against which all such statements may be
judged.' 17 ' Nonetheless, the Court did brush a few broad strokes
along which analysis of the controlling interests should run.'
Interests to be weighted include: (1) maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers, (2) need for confidentiality, (3) employee's position may be such that his false accusations may be hard to
counter because of the employee's presumed greater access to the
real facts, (4) statements which impede the employee's proper performance of an educator's daily duties, (5) statements so without
foundation as to call into question an educator's competency to perform his job and (6) a close and personal working relationship calling for personal loyalty and confidence between employee and supervisor. Two key factual issues often entertained by the courts in
these cases are, whether the issues upon which the teacher has spoken
are of public concern and whether the teacher's statements were
knowingly false or recklessly made. Applying the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 7 4 standard for defamation of public officials, the
Court in Pickering held: "[I]n a case such as this, absent proof of
false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.' 7"
In Clark v. Holmes,17 L. Verdelle Clark, a teacher at Northern
Illinois University (NIU), sought damages against certain NIU officials who allegedly wished to penalize him for exercising his right
170.
171.
172.
173.

391
408
391
Id.

U.S. at 568.
U.S. 493 (1972).
U.S. at 569.
See also Jepsen v. Bd. of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417

(1958) in which the court came closest to committing itself to a given definition of

"cause."
174.
175.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

176.

474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
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to freedom of speech. Clark accepted a temporary position as associate professor at NIU to teach an introductory health course for the
1962-63 academic year. In a letter dated April 30, 1963, Clark was
offered another temporary position for the 1963-64 academic year.
The letter also warned Clark that he should remedy certain deficiencies in his professional conduct:
[Hie counseled an excessive number of students instead of referring them to
NIU's professional counsellors; he overemphasized sex in his health survey
and he belittled
course; he counselled students with his office door1 closed;
77
other staff members in his discussions with students.

The letter was in effect a statement of reasons on which his renewal
was conditioned. Clark subsequently discussed these criticisms with
the department head. He defended his conduct and stated that he
had surveyed his students and found that they wanted sex education
and mental health emphasized. He rejected disapproval of his crit-

ical remarks as hypocritical and declared that he would not stop,
nor would he confine his discussions to his office.

In early 1964,

Clark was told that he would not be scheduled for any classes for
the spring semester, 1963-64.

Clark filed suit in federal district court and at trial urged the court
to instruct the jury to the effect that a public school teacher has a First
Amendment right to teach and say anything he wishes in classes and to
students as long as he does not make statements knowing them to be false
178
or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.

The instruction was refused and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, hold-

ing that the claim must fail for two reasons.
First, Clark construes too broadly the extent of his First Amendment right
and thus slights the interest of the State in providing its educational services
according to policies it deems proper. . . . Second, Clark ignores the factual differences between his case and a case like Pickering. His disputes
with his superiors and colleagues about course content and counselling were
not "matters of public concern" and involved Clark as a teacher rather
than as an interested citizen. [Citations omitted]. Further, Clark has cited
no sound authority for his proposition that he had a constitutional right to
override the wishes and judgment of his superiors and fellow faculty members as to the proper content of the required health course. . . .179

Another Seventh Circuit case, Donahue v. Staunton,'8 0 though not
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 930.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 931.
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972).
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dealing with teachers, balanced closely analogous interests. Joseph
Donahue served as Catholic Chaplain at Manteno State Hospital
from July, 1964, to December, 1969. He was dismissed by the hospital for making statements which the employer believed contained
falsehoods and half-truths which were detrimental to the operation
of the hospital and the well-being of the patients. The court found
that the questions of mental health care were "matters of public concern" and that at the time of their issuance, Father Donahue's
statements were reasonably believed to be true by him and were not
knowingly false and recklessly made. Since the hospital could not
prove that Donahue's vociferousness hindered him in the performance
of his major role, his religious and spiritual duties toward the patients, society's interest in "uninhibited and robust debate" on matters of public concern outweighed those of the state as an employer.
The hospital had also argued that Father Donahue's accusations
were so extensive and so critical as to impede the performance of his
duties to address professional and lay groups to promote understanding of problems concerning patients and to interpret the hospital's problems and policies. The court did not disagree with this
contention. Instead, it found that this was not such a critical responsibility of a chaplain so as to give the state a strong enough interest in interfering with his first amendment rights. The court felt
this was especially so since Donahue had been rated on several factors
periodically during his employment, but was not rated on this particular factor until May, 1969. To sustain a first amendment claim
on the basis of Clark and Donahue, a teacher's statement must pertain to matters of public concern and must not be knowingly false
or recklessly made. Even assuming 'the conditions are met, it is still
theoretically possible for the state to dismiss or refuse to renew the
employee, using the guidelines in Pickering, if the questioned statements impede the performance of his primary duties so as to give the
state a strong enough interest in interfering with his first amendment
rights. The court, however, looks askance at chilling preferred
freedoms. Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the state's
burden looms large.
In Hetrick v. Martin,181 a state university failed to renew the contract of a nontenured teacher because her pedagogical style and
181.

480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).
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philosophy did not conform to the pattern prescribed by the school
administration. Ms. Hetrick relied in part on Healy v. James,'82 in
which the Supreme Court reaffirmed academic freedom as a protected right of teachers. She argued that "teaching methods"
should be included in the concept of academic freedom as a protected
form of speech, that the first amendment protected her from termination for using teaching methods and adhering to a teaching philosophy well-recognized within the profession.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed:
We do not accept plaintiff's assertion that the school administration abridged
her First Amendment rights when it refused to rehire her because it considered her teaching philosophy to be incompatible with the pedagogical

aims of the University. Whatever may be the ultimate scope of the amorphous "academic freedom" . . . it does not encompass the right of a nontenured teacher to have her teaching style insulated from review by her
superiors when they determine whether she has merited tenured status just

because her methods and philosophy are considered acceptable somewhere
183
within the teaching profession.

In Clark, the court similarly stated that
it is now clear that academic freedom, the preservation of the classroom as
a "marketplace of ideas," is one of the safeguarded rights [citation omitted]. But we do not conceive academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular contents and in184
ternally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution.

To summarize, the Supreme Court in Healy made it clear that
academic freedom is one of the safeguarded rights. The Sixth Circuit in Hetrick and the Seventh Circuit in Clark have ruled that expression and subject matter emphasis at variance with established
curricular content and teaching methods and philosophy which are
incompatible with the pedagogical aims of the school are without
the scope of academic freedom. Since teaching methods, deviation
from established course content, and similar behavior patterns normally come to light during the first few years of employment, both
Hetrick and Clark dealt with nontenured teachers. It appears, however, that should a tenured teacher radically change his teaching
methods or substantially deviate from established course content he,
too, might be subject to dismissal.
182.

408 U.S. 169 (1972).

183 480 F.2d at 709.
184. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973).
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In Lafferty v. Carter'8 a Wisconsin federal district court held that
the protection afforded a teacher in exercising his right to freedom
of expression reaches a suspension, even without loss of pay, as well
as to a termination. In Hajduk v. Vocational Technical and Adult
Education District,8 6 the plaintiff contended that the reasons for his
nonretention was his criticism of the school board. Ruling on a
motion to dismiss by the defendant school board, the court held
that "simply stating this contention in his pleadings, as plaintiff
7
does, is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.'11
In Center School District v. Gieringer18 the court held that nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract for delivering a report
to the teacher's union which disputed the board's financial inability
to offer a greater salary increase abridged the teacher's rights of free
speech and was impermissible. In some recent decisions, courts have
expanded the rights of secondary school teachers to engage in
"mild political" expression in the classroom.18 9
Finally, though only in the brightest part of the penumbra of free
expression, Susan Bravo's case was an important link in the teacher's rights chain. In Bravo v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago"'0 the district court held that interrupting the pupil-teacher
relationship by requiring mandatory maternity leave at the sixth
month' 9' placed an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the
individual rights in play. The employer's interest in the orderly procedure must fall: such a purpose was of insufficient validity and
185. 310 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
186. 356 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
187. Id. at 35.
188. 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1973).
189. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1341 (1973). One form of private expression
by a teacher which is not protected, at least by California courts, is mildly unorthodox sexual dallying, even though engaged in at a private swingers party which
happened to be infiltrated by a police officer. The fourth amendment apparently
having been temporarily suspended, she was charged with three felony counts and
later pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor of outraging public decency. Three years
later the state board revoked her teaching credentials, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed. Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., - Cal. 3d -, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 665 (1973).
190. 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
191. RuLEs OF THE BoARi OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 4.37
(1972).
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rationality to overcome the determination by the plaintiff and her
students to continue the educational process. The Board did not
contend that learning from a pregnant teacher would damage the
students.
While it is a concededly optimistic view, the pregnancy phenomenon19 2 and its resolution by the Bravo court can be read to suggest
a principle. Rules of administrative convenience or whim which
encroach on the educational process, must fall. Court extension of
this principle might be one small chisel to use on the mountain of administrative waste characteristic of large public school systems.
C.

Expansion of Rights from "Teachers" to "Educators": The
Administrative Right to Criticize and Keep Working

In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District'98 the Seventh
Circuit for the first time held that the rights of free expression and
procedural due process given to teachers and other public employees
extend to administrators and specifically to Prairie State College
President Richard W. Hostrop. The court recognized that administrators act as direct agents of their schools and are thereby sufficiently different from teachers as to be subject to a different set of
interests and a different test. Nonetheless, administrators are protected by the first and fourteenth amendments and school boards
must accord them the same substantive and procedural rights accorded teachers.
In his role as College President, Hostrop had prepared a confidential memorandum requesting his administrative staff to consider certain proposed changes in the college's ethnic studies program. An
unknown person made the memorandum public and certain mem192. The Bravo opinion is an excellent catalog of cases and sources on rights of
teachers and students. For other courts which share similar views, see William v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Buckley v.
Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (1973). Contra, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Pregnant students have a right to
remain in school almost to term, according to a legal opinion of OSPI. See OSPI,
FORMAL OPINION No. 4, 1972. If the student chooses, she may claim special education or home instruction, but the decision is the student's and her doctor's, not
the school administrator's. Should the courts share the opinion of OSPI, which
seems likely after Bravo, the traditional rule of excluding pregnant students may
fall victim to the Constitution.
193. 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
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bers of the Board questioned Hostrop's right to make such a proposal. The Board later met and terminated Hostrop's contract without a hearing. The College Board found language in Pickering19 4 to
differentiate between teachers and administrators arguing that
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary for the proper functioning of
the working relationship between Dr. Hostrop and themselves, and that
since the circulation of the ethnic studies memorandum could have argu195
ably affected this loyalty and confidence, Hostrop can be discharged.

The district court agreed with the Board and dismissed Hostrop's
complaint.' 96 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the interpretation
of Pickering offered by the board and the district court and reversed
saying
Pickering should not be read to authorize the discharge of a college president merely because he expresses an opinion that could be interpreted
as a sign of disloyalty or an undermining of the confidence placed in him.
Instead, Pickering holds that an employee's speech may be regulated only
if a public entity can show that its functions are being substantially im19 7
peded by the employee's statements.

Absent actual proof of such an impairment, it was improper to dis1 98
miss the complaint on first amendment grounds.
Turning to the issue of the no-hearing discharge the court next
found a denial of procedural due process. Relying on Board of Regents v. Roth,'9 9 the appellate court held that the plaintiff had made
a credible showing of deprivation of "liberty" and "property" as defined in Roth.'
The finding of deprivation of "liberty" was based
on the Board's attack on Hostrop's veracity in its reasons for his discharge. Deprivation of "property" was found in the two remaining
years in Hostrop's employment contract. Following Roth, the court
balanced the Board's interest in maintaining efficiency through the
194. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
195. 471 F.2d at 492.
196. Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist., 337 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
197. 471 F.2d at 492.
198. In a footnote the court stated that the district court thought the issue of
whether the memorandum was distributed publicly or privately was important because of its view that the first amendment does not protect private communications.
This point was not argued on appeal, but the court noted that past decisions have
extended the first amendment to protect private statements made by public employees. 471 F.2d at 493 n.13.
199. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
200. See text accompanying notes 149 and 150, supra.
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prompt removal of its chief administrator against Hostrop's interest
in protecting his first amendment rights and future employment prospects. The Constitution was on the plaintiff's side. The court reversed and ordered a hearing before an impartial tribunal.
In Washington v. Board of Education2 ° ' the plaintiff was terminated as the acting principal of an elementary school. The alleged
reason for the termination was his exercise of his first amendment
rights on two occasions in a fashion deemed critical by the Board.
Washington sued, and the district court dismissed on December 14,
1972, following its decision in Hostrop.202 Seven days later Hostrop was reversed. The district court refused a motion to modify
the judgment in light of a change in the law, and Washington's appeal
is pending, with oral argument having been set for December 3, 1973.
In its brief, the defendant Board admits the expansion of first amendment rights to administrators but denies the basis for terminating
Washington. It seems likely the Seventh Circuit will follow its
Hostrop ruling, thus continuing the extension of constitutional rights
to all educators." °
The law of administrator's rights and, to a lesser extent, teacher's
rights is developing in the curious and somewhat anomalous direction
whereby the employee can be terminated if he or she cannot maintain a close working relationship with and consistently represent the
interests of the employer-board, unless the cause for the degeneration
in the relationship is criticism related to public issues and protected
by the first amendment. Strange as it sounds, educators who foresee
difficulty with their employers might be advised to engage in a little
or a lot of public criticism of their employers in order to be able to
charge that the termination is in retaliation for conduct protected by
the first amendment. This also preserves the considerable threat of
a federal lawsuit as the time for renewal or termination nears.
201. Civil No. 72-2219 (N.D. Ill., dismissed, Dec. 14, 1972).
202. 337 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
203. Coincidentally, a third case very nearly presented itself at the same time
when Timuel Black, a respected but vocal administrator in the Chicago City College
system, was terminated over differences with Chancellor Oscar Shabat. Black found
his remedy in the public and political arena and regained his employ much more
quickly and cheaply than either Hostrop or Washington. Chicago Sun-Times, July 9,
1973 at 7; and July 28, 1973 at 17.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
IV.

[Vol. 23:402

DEVELOPMENTS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION

In the field of special education, the General Assembly, during

the past few years, has created a statutory scheme which is unparalleled in the nation.

Articles 14, 14A and 14B of the School Code

secure to all exceptional children in Illinois free public educational
services appropriate to the needs of each.20 4 With these statutes in
effect, there now exist the laws needed to realize the goal expressed
in the Illinois Constitution: ". . . the educational development of
20 5
all persons to the limits of their capacities.
Briefly, every public school district must either:

1. Provide specialized services and facilities for all statutory categories of
exceptional children; or
2. Provide some categories of facilities and services and join with other
districts in a special educational cooperative district to gain access to
complimentary services; or if it can do neither 1 or 2, then
3. Send its exceptional children to public or private special education
facilities where the exceptional students can secure the educational
services appropriate for their needs.200

The district and the state presently share the tuition bill up to $2,000
(30 percent paid by the district and 70 percent paid by the state)
and 1973 amendments to provide for full state payment were vetoed.20 7 The Superintendent of Public Instruction is empowered to

establish elaborate regulations for the identification, classification and
placement of exceptional children and for registration, inspection,
recognition and approval of public and private schools providing special education services pursuant to section 14-7.02.208 These Regula204. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 to 14-14.01, 14A-1 to 14A-8, 14B-1
to 14B-8 (1971). Article 14 deals with services for children traditionally defined
as "handicapped"; physically (§ 14-1.02); emotionally disturbed or maladjusted (§
14-1.03); learning disabled (§ 14-1.03a); educable mentally handicapped (§ 141.04); trainable mentally handicapped (§ 14-1.05); speech defective (§ 14-1.06);
and multiply handicapped (§ 14-1.07). Article 14A provides for identification of
and special services to gifted children (§§ 14A-1 et seq.). Article 14B provides
for special education to children of normal intelligence suffering educational handicaps, for example, because of a different language or inadequate preschool or primary
training (§§ 14B-1 et seq.).
205.

ILL. CONsT. art. X, § 1.

206. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-4.01, 14-5.01, 14-6.01 (1971).
207. Both houses of the General Assembly have passed House Bill 805 raising
the 9-month tuition reimbursement to $3,000. Like other financing bills, Governor
Daniel Walker vetoed it, also.
208.

ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (1971).
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tions were completed and became effective July 1, 1973 . 2 09 Like all
of the regulations promulgated by the Office of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction (OSPI), these are printed and should be available
free of charge from the OSPI. Unfortunately, the regulations are too
often out of stock or out of print and simply gaining access to a complete set of current regulations is a formidable obstacle to the practitioner. Law libraries do not own and probably could not maintain
current sets, and school boards or special education co-op districts
and schools often do not have or cannot find their copies. The OSPI
could perform a significant service by codifying all of its regulations in
one form and make subscriptions available at a minimal cost to interested persons.
The difficulty of access to the regulations is only one of several obstacles facing the smooth and universal application of the laws. The
degree to which the law is obeyed and the degree and quality of services available varies immensely throughout the state, often varying
within the same county, particularly Cook County, and varying even
among the different categories of students receiving special education
services in the same district.
The spotty quality of specialized services provides a partial explanation for the use of the term "goal" in article X of the Constitution. Appropriate special education services are several years away,
but the legal tools are well aged. It will be necessary to find the
money and, to a lesser extent, the know-how to put the law into statewide effect.
The 1973 OSPI Regulations for special education require that each
school district, independently or in cooperation with other school
districts, provide a comprehensive program of special education for
children between the ages of three and twenty-one who reside in
the school district. This requirement is essentially the same as that
2 10
of the Illinois School Code.
Assignment to a special education program is undoubtedly a welcome benefit to most of the children so classified. Nevertheless,
such an assignment tends to stigmatize a child and determine the
course of his or her future education in a disturbingly permanent
209. See note 211, infra.
210. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-4.01,
14A-2, 14B-1 to 14B-2 (1971); and note 211, infra.

14-1.02 to 14-1.07,

14A-1 to
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manner. Thus, while a perceptive assignment to an appropriate
special education program can be immensely beneficial to the exceptional child, an insensitive, ill-motivated or premature assignment to
special education can be disastrous. An improper classification always creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. The student begins to react to
education in the manner expected, that is, as a person with a learning difficulty. Hopefully, such a misclassification would be detected
as soon as possible, nevertheless, the interests involved are so critical
as to require that considerable attention be given to the problem of
misclassification.
The Special Education Rules 2" set out fairly detailed procedures for the identification of exceptional children, placement and
programming for them, and review of those decisions on their behalf.2" 2 Children identified as candidates for special education programs are given a complete case study evaluation which includes a
social development study, a medical history, vision and hearing
tests and an educational and psychological evaluation.2" 3 A child
whose primary language is not English is to be evaluated in his primary language.21 4 Should the child's evaluation indicate visual, hearing, speech or other physical or mental impairment, a learning disability, an education maladjustment, or a behavioral disorder, the
child is eligible for special education.21 5
A parent has the right to request a review of the educational placement of his or her child. 2 16 This review is intended to substantiate
the requirement for special education and is to be accomplished at
a meeting of the parents, their representatives, authors of the placement decision, special education administrators and local school
211.
TION,

STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCRULES AND

REGULATIONS

TO

GOVERN

ADMINISTRATION

AND

OPERATION

OF

SPECIAL EDUCATION (1973) [hereinafter referred to as SPECIAL EDUCATION RULES].
The SPECIAL EDUCATION RULES define the responsibility for special education, provide for its establishment and administration, outline the nature of special education
instructional programs and supportive services, provide general procedures for the
identification and evaluation of exceptional children and for a review of educational
placement. SPECIAL EDUC. RULES art. II, §§ 2.01 to 2.04 (1973).

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. arts. X-XI.
Id.§§ 9.03(1)(a) and (b).
Id.§ 9.05.
Id. §§ 9.09(l)-(9).
Id. § 11.01.
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district personnel.2 1 '
To assist them in their review, parents may retain, at their own
expense, appropriate professional workers. Both the parents and
their consultants are allowed access to information upon which the
placement decision was based. Two types of information, however,
are kept secret from the parents and their experts:
1. Personal observations of school personnel or case workers having no
bearing on the placement, and
2.

Test instruments and raw data which will only be released to profes218
sional workers of like discipline.

Detailed hearing procedures have been provided by the OSPI lawyers, including a provision for the preservation of a transcribed record.21 9 There is no provision, however, for providing expert consultation, at state expense, for indigent parents. If the parents are unsatisfied with the placement review, they have five days from receipt
of the local board's decision to request state level review with personnel of the OSPI. 22 ° The time for appeal may be extended 30
days.2 2 ' Any system of classification has certain dangers and classification in the field of education is routinely and justifiably criticized
as unreliable. Tests used in the classification process are, never
free of some cultural bias. As a result, children of certain cultural
groups run the risk of being classified into special educational groupings with a frequency greater than would be expected by a distribution resulting from a culturally unbiased evaluation.
The stigma attached to a special education classification, the consequent denial of "normal" educational experiences and the potential
damage which can result from the all too frequent and possibly longterm misclassifications are all eloquent arguments for a system of
strict procedural safeguards and checks in the classification process.
The power of the state to classify students into ability groupings
(often called "tracks") and special education categories and the
machinery for so doing are the subjects of substantial bodies of lit217.
218.

Id. § 11.04.
Id. §§ 11.06(1) and (2).

219.
220.

Id. §§ 11.07-11.11.
Id. § 11.12.

221.

Id. § 11.13.
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erature in both the legal and educational disciplines and are generally beyond the scope of this article. A leading case which catalogs
the arguments and issues is Mills v. Board of Education where the
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the city's
"tracking" system was constitutionally defective because it handily
directed the black students-the majority of the D.C. school population-into the lowest tracks. 22
It appears that courts are increasingly receptive to due process challenges to state actions categorizing citizens where the classification
has effects which are, in the citizens' view, punitive or at least pejorative and stigmatizing. For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantinieau, 22s the statute which authorized the labeling, without notice
or hearing, of a citizen as unfit to be served liquor was declared unconstitutional. It is likely that many elements of the public school
systems' categorizing machinery are vulnerable to this kind of attack
absent the school systems' attempt to provide some due process and
review.
While the procedures set out in the Rules at first appear to guarantee adequate due process in a proceeding which should be professional, non-adversary and objectively keyed to the student's best interests, there remain some questionable areas. While parents can
theoretically protest with the help of experts (although the cost of
experts may exclude low-income parents from this procedure) and
seek review of their child's assignment to a special education program, they are not made privy to the hard information at the basis
of the decision. The Rules provide:
Prior to the conference, the parents may request a professional worker of
their choice and at their expense (including legal counsel) to meet with
the appropriate school personnel to discuss the reasons for the placement.

The information on which the placement decision was made shall be made
available for examination by the parents or their representatives, with the
following exceptions:
1-Personal observations which in the opinion of the superintendent of
the local school district, would have no direct bearing on placement
shall not be available for examination nor shall they be introduced
at the review conference.
222.

Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

223.

400 U.S. 433 (1973).
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2-Test instruments and raw data shall be reviewed only by a profes224
sional worker of like discipline.

Thus, the school withholds such data as the superintendent dictates.
There is no remedy. Additionally, there is the added burden of hiring
an "expert"-perhaps a private psychologist to counter the school psychologist. In fact, the information is sometimes withheld from the
experts, and there is no way to police the board. 225

Such confronta-

tions are relatively rare since the experts charge about $150 or
more for these services, and parents with that kind of money and
sophistication will likely have made private school arrangements if
dissatisfied with their child's public special education.
Rare is the parent who will or is able to confront the formidable
"staffing" scenario at which some special education assignments are
made. Most people are frightened by, and remain mincingly respectful to, teachers, principals and school psychologists. The conversation may be heavily jargonized with rhetoric about Johnny's
unique needs and the unseen test results. The unarmed parent and
child stand little chance.
The parents' experience, instincts and opinions are generally not
consulted in the classification process, 226 and their full participation
in the hearing is precluded without the expenditure of considerable
224. SPECIAL EDUc. RULES § 11.06.
225. The subject of access to records, particularly those used in evaluating students, normal, handicapped, disturbed or whatever is one about which school administrators are sensitive to the point of paranoia. While all student records are
routinely shipped to the police, juvenile court, immigration authorities, welfare departments and the Department of Justice, they are never released to parents, or,
absent a hard subpoena fight, to students' attorneys. See ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 34-18(3) (Supp. 1973); CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION POLICY: DISSEMINATION
OF INFORMATION FROM SCHOOL RECORDS INCLUDINo CHILD STUDY [Psychological and
Psychiatric] RECORDS AND MEDICAL RECORDS, January, 1971.
On the difficulty of viewing any records, even public financial ones, see Research Study-The Chicago Board of Education and Public Access to Information,
68 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1973) wherein it is concluded that the willingness of the
Chicago Board to release information generally changes according to its assessment
of the requester's politics and motives.
226. Nowhere in the SPECIAL EDUCATION RULES is there a requirement for
parental consultation during the classification process prior to the hearing. It is
this observer's experience that, in cases where there is any hint of antagonism during
the classification process, the often useful and accurate input of the parents is foregone and reliance is placed on professional mystique. The phenomenon is particularly found in cases where the parents are not from a social or educational
level the educator perceives to be lower than his own.
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fees for an expert. The upshot of the procedure described in the
Rules is a hearing which can easily be perverted so that only the
appearance and not the substance of due process is preserved.
Not addressed by the Rules is the obverse situation where a parent
actively seeks testing, classification and special educational placement for his or her child, and the school refuses to so act. The only
remedy in the face of steadfast opposition or inertia is for the parents
to make such pests of themselves as to evoke action. An alternative
legalistic approach would be to make a written request for testing
evaluation, and, if warranted, placement within a reasonable time.
If no action ensues, the parents should attempt an administrative
appeal on the theory that the inaction or nonresponse is a decision
in "controversies arising under the school law" and thus reviewable
by the Superintendent of the Educational Service Region and the
State Superintendent.2 27 Numerous empirical tests of this approach
have produced no reaction whatsoever by the Superintendent of the
Educational Service Region and OSPI.
While mandamus is theoretically available, parents would be far
better advised to spend the money on private testing, evaluation and
placement in an appropriate private school, and then, with the
fait accompli, request a tuition reimbursement under section 147.02. Lawyers, like all other expert consultants, are expensive. This
last tactic has been successfully employed by some parents, particularly in the Chicago Public School District where the very weight of
the bureaucracy and strained resources make all processes and services slow.
It is unclear at present on whom the burden of finding an appropriate private school legally falls. While myriad consultation
and referral resources are theoretically available to parents, and finding the proper programs should be a joint effort with primarily
professional input, some school districts take the position that the
tender of the $2000 offer and a list of private schools absolves the
public school of further duty to secure placement in an appropriate
program. 2
The Chicago Board does this from time to time, particularly to students it has handily categorized "to be a distinct detrimental influence to the conduct of the school, or to be unable to profit
227.
228.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 3-10, 2-3.8 (1971).
Id. § 14-7.02.
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from further experience in the school. '229
Embryonic attempts to challenge this procedure and to impress a
duty upon public schools to find the proper program have been fruitless to date. Letters demanding review of these actions at the Educational Service Region and OSPI level as a "controversy arising under
the School Code" remain unanswered.
According to the present scheme, two economic considerations
obstruct the local district's decision to provide for a student's education in a specialized private school: first, the district would lose one
capita in its average daily attendance report and thus one share of
its proportional state aid; second, it would have to pay out its 30
percent share of the private school tuition-almost always the $2,000
maximum. 230 Additionally, the local board must provide the entire
nine month fee of $2000 at the beginning of the school year and then
seek the $1400 reimbursement from the state. At present, these reimbursement payments are running about sixteen months behind.
In 1973 the General Assembly provided for greater subsidy of
special education services in the public schools and concurrently
sought to amend the private tuition reimbursement law to allow the
state to pay the entire $2000 with no local contribution required.2"'
The latter attempt failed, but is again on the agenda for the 1974
session. Should it pass and should the laws of basic economics
operate, the local district will be more willing to place exceptional
students in private schools. Hopefully, this would be true in the case
of a student presenting both a 'behavior problem and possible emotional disorder or other exceptional characteristics. Heretofore, the
local board's usual action would be to suspend or expel the student,
despite the broad invitation of the suspension-expulsion statute to
explore special educational alternatives.2 3 2 Section 14-7.02 presents
the potential for far more imaginative approaches to securing and
preserving the exceptional Illinois child's right to appropriate education than have yet been tried.
The administration of the tuition reimbursement program is presently an administrative quagmire, the drainage of which has been
229.
230.

Enuc. RULES § 6.8 (1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Supp. 1972).
231. Id. and §§ 14-7.03, 14-13.01 (Supp. 1973).
232. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(d) (Supp. 1972) which is set out at
n.121, supra.
CHICAGO BD. OF
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hampered by the need to use successive sets of draft regulations.
With the promulgation of the final Regulations on July 1, 1973, some
movement toward efficiency will undoubtedly occur. The tuition
reimbursement program, now in its fifth year, remains fraught with
wrangles and beset by problems, notwithstanding its benefits. There
are, however, some fantastic success stories.
Red tape aside, the most serious problem with the section 14-7.02
tuition reimbursement program is the $2000 limit. It is effectively
impossible to run a high quality, private, special education program
within the current rules for that amount. The General Assembly
this year passed a bill providing a more realistic but still inadequate
2 3
$3000 figure. This bill fell victim to a money-saving veto. 8
On this point a potentially far-reaching class action suit has been
filed and is now pending in the Cook County Circuit Court. 3 4 The
plaintiffs are seeking to require full payment of the tuition for the
most appropriate special education program without regard to amount.
One named plaintiff, a tragically multiply-handicapped boy, attends
an extremly specialized residential school of national repute, the price
of which is probably $800 per month or more. 235 The plaintiffs are
asking the court to go further than it is probably able to, but the
suit is illustrative of a potentially large number of yet untried strategies to secure the educational rights of exceptional children.
Nationally, exceptional students and their parents are just crossing
the threshhold of the special schoolhouse. Notwithstanding Rodriguez, the army of previously unserviced or underserviced children
with special educational needs is beginning to fight and win the battle
for recognition and equal educational services. The legislation and
litigation in this area will doubtlessly increase.23 There is a nascent
233. The current costs include not only the huge labor item (certified special
education teachers must be paid) but also expensive record keeping and coordination
with the public school, and the irrationally

expensive proposition of finding a

schoolhouse which complies with all state and local building, zoning, fire, licensing,
health and political rules. See also H.B. 305, 78th ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (1973).
234.

Elliot v. Bd. of Educ., No. 73 Ch. 6104 (Cook Cty. filed Oct. 1973).

235.

It is interesting to note here the irony of the shipment by the State of

Illinois from 1963 to 1972 of state wards (almost all classified "emotionally disturbed") to Texas residential institutions at rates of up to $710 per month. Some of

the children received no schooling whatever. See P.
AN ANALYSIS

KEENAN, AN ILLINOIS TRAGEDY:
OF THE PLACEMENT OF ILLINOIS WARDS IN THE STATE OF TEXAS

(DePaul University 1973).
236. To date there are no published Illinois court opinions concerning special

education and the laws controlling it.

There is a small cluster of cases, usually
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but viable and growing militancy among parents of exceptional children which has already been noted by the lawmakers. The American
dream of universal free public education for all children, even those

who "couldn't benefit from education" during darker ages, may
23 7
finally be realized. It is an idea whose time has come.
V.

CURRENT MOVES IN THE MONEY GAME AND THE RETREAT
OF EQUAL PROTECTION:

A GLANCE

Probably the most critical and regressive development in 1972-73
school law in Illinois or anywhere else in the country was the Nixon
Court's 5-4 opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,118 which declared that education is not a constitutional
right,2 3 9 thus placing the court's stamp of approval on public education financing schemes which permit and perpetuate gross differences
in resources and quality. Equal protection is not deemed violated
when, as a result of economically dictated racist geography, black,
brown and poor white children consistently happen to attend the
poorest, lowest quality schools and thus continue to reap the burden
of grinding cyclical poverty. Such is the state of the law of the
land. The most eloquent criticism came from within the court:
The majority's decision represents an abrupt departure from the mainstream
of recent state and federal court decisions concerning the unconstitutionality
of state educational financing schemes dependent upon taxable local wealth.
More unfortunately, though, the majority's holding can only be seen as a
retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity
and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in
their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.
The Court does this despite the absence of any substantial justification for
filed by legal aid foundations or clinics wending their way through other trial courts.
See, e.g., Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(1972); Harrison v. State, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich., S.D., Oct. 30, 1972).
237. For further information: The OSPI actively solicits inquiries about the
Illinois Special Education Programs. For information write Mr. Fred G. Rozum,
Assistant Superintendent for Special Educational Programs, OSPI, 525 S. Spring
Street, Springfield, Ill. 62706. There are numerous parent and professional groups
interested in programs for exceptional students which have joined in the Coordinating Council for the Handicapped Children and the Mental Health Coalition, both
at 407 S. Dearborn, Chicago, IIl. 60604. In 1970, the Council published a directory,
Services for Exceptional Children ($1.25), listing many special education facilities.
All of the Illinois universities with graduate schools of education can provide some
information; particularly current in special education is the graduate school at
Northeastern Illinois University.
238. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
239. Id. at 75.
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a scheme which arbitrarily channels educational resources in accordance
with the fortuity of the amount of taxable wealth within each district.
In my judgment, the right of every American to an equal start in life so
far as the provision of a state service as important as education is concerned,
is far too vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous as those
presented by this record. Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient
to remit these appellees to the vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proven singularly unsuited to the task
of providing a remedy for this discrimination. I, for one, am unsatisfied
with the hope of an ultimate "political" solution sometime in the indefinite
future while, in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations that "may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954).240

The Rodriguez decision abruptly disarmed a phalanx of cases, including Serrano v. Priest141 where the California Supreme Court held
that that state's educational financing system, based on local property taxes which remained at the collection point, was a violation of
equal protection. Such an arrangement guaranteed that the rich
children attended the best schools while the poor children attended the
worst. Within the space of a year and a half, similar suits had
been filed in most of the other forty-eight 4 2 states with corresponding
systems of school financing

In Serrano the California court held that the right to an education
is a fundamental interest and therefore, state laws which allowed dis-

crimination were subject to the "close scrutiny" test of equal protection: "[Tlhe state bears the burden of establishing not only that it

has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose. ' 243 The
court found that the wealth of the school districts, as measured by

their assessed valuations, was the major determinant of educational
expenditures and thus ascertained
that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because
it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his
parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an educa240. Id. at 70-72 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
241. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
242. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 34 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971);
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
243. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (emphasis by
the court).
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tion in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitating
the present method of financing. We have concluded, therefore, that such
constitutional challenge and must fall before the
a system cannot withstand
244
equal protection clause.

With a seemingly clear principle, sound theory and compelling
equities upon which to base their hope and confidence, a group of
Mexican-American children from a poor Texas district filed a threejudge district court action attacking the defective quality of their education. Texas public schools are financed from combined state and
local tax receipt coffers. The state antes a basic minimum per capita and the local school district produces the balance from ad valorem
property taxes-a system akin to that of California, Illinois and most
other states.
245
The district court accordingly struck down the Texas scheme
and the rich districts appealed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell, a former attorney for a well-financed school board, concluded that the Texas system did not operate to the peculiar advantage of any suspect class and that education is not among the rights
explicitly or implicitly protected by the federal Constitution.2 46
The opinion, and particularly the dissent by Justice Marshall, is required reading for all practitioners in the field of education law. An
even battle has suddenly become unbalanced.
The Illinois variant of the question was presented by Niles Mayor
Nicholas Blase and Chicago School Board Member Gerald Sbarbaro,24 7 who, departing from the straight equal protection theory,
based their demands on the phrase in the education article of the new
constitution: "The state has the primary responsibility for financing
24 s
the system of public education.
Illinois' present system of school financing employs a widely used
"equalization formula" which has been used in one form or another
since the 1930's. The formula has three components: first, the
state is to establish a foundation to determine the minimal cost for
244. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
245. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971).
246. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,18 (1973).
247. Blase v. State, - I11. 2d -, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973).
248. ILL. CONsT. art. X, § 1.
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producing an educational program and then this amount is multiplied by the number of pupils in a particular district; second, each
school district, in order to be eligible for state assistance, must set

a tax rate on its property owners which is multiplied by the assessed
valuation of the district; and third, the amount resulting from
Step 2 is subtracted from Step 1 and the state pays the difference. 49
The Supreme Court of Illinois found the vehicle for preserving the

system's status quo by interpreting the quoted section of the Constitution as only a "goal," not a requirement. To support its opinion,
the court dug deep into the records of the 1970 Constitutional Convention and dredged up a quote from the proposing delegate (now
249. The Illinois School financing scheme is set out in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§§ 17-1 et seq. (1971). The following example will illustrate the formula and the
problem it generates:
FORMULA USED IN TWO DISTRICTS
WHICH DIFFER ONLY IN ASSESSED VALUATION

Step I

District I

District II

State Foundation Level
Number of Pupils

$

(Poor)
600
X 200

$

(Rich)
600
x 200

State Foundation Level

$

120,000

$

120,000

Step 2
Assessed Valuation
Rate of District Tax

$10,000,000
X .0090

$20,000,000
X .0090

Amount Raised by Local District

$

$

90,000

180,000

Step 3
Result from Step 1
Result from Step 2

$
120,000
less 90,000

$
120,000
less 180,000

30,000
State Aid
Annual per student
expenditure
$
600
$
300
Thus even with state aid, the children in the poor district will get a significantly
cheaper education, that is, the $600 state minimum. To achieve parity of expenditure per capita, District I would have to tax itself twice the rate of District II.
To achieve parity of quality, District I might have to tax itself thrice the rate, since
it is a safe assumption that equal educational quality will carry a higher price tag
in the poor district, with its older school buildings, greater social problems, higher
incidence of teacher turnover and handicapped children, higher costs for security, etc.
It is a widespread and probably correct observation that, given the present size
of the educational money pie (with its 5 per cent federal, 40 per cent state, and
55 per cent local ingredients) and assuming no differential for higher metropolitan
area costs, any of the equalizing plans suggested, including the 51 per cent idea
advanced by Blase and Sbarbaro, would result in a net loss of revenue for every
district in Cook County.
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senator) Dawn Clark Netsch to the effect that her language which
did appear in article X was "not a legally obligatory command to
the state legislature."250 The plaintiffs did not regard the loss as
total but argued that the suits had served as a catalyst in the General
Assembly's decision to increase the state contribution from about 30
percent to 40 percent this year. The state contribution may be 50
percent within four years.251
School financing is the subject of an enormous literature and a
tumultuous, sometimes irrational, debate. Rivers of ink, mountains
of paper and a torrent of words have produced few answers. Secular subsidization of the Catholic school system, the traditional pressure relief valve, seems constitutionally impossible.252 The often
proposed idea of a voucher system remains untried in Illinois. 258 Private, alternative and free schools are equally caught in the cost bind.
Despite dispensing with a building and its maintenance costs, Chicago's
innovative Metro High incurs about the same per student costs
as conventional schools, though there may be a significant quality difference. Little more can be said within the scope of this Survey.
Perhaps Rodriguez, as Plessy v. Ferguson254 before it, will not be the
final word on the right of all young citizens to equal educational
dollars.
VI.

THE GREENING OF ILLINOIS SCHOOLS:

POSSIBILITIES

AND PROMISES

A consistent theme in the Illinois education culture is embodied in
the pretention and hope of continued improvement directed toward
that elusive commodity, excellence. The constitution itself calls for
an efficient system of high quality schools and services so that all
250.

SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION,

5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

4502 (1972).
251. See Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 26, 1973, at 62.

252.

The General Assembly's most recent attempt to keep the Catholic and

other religious affiliated schools open consisted of a $30 million appropriation for
secular textbooks and auxiliary services (P.A. 77-1894); and a plan to reimburse low
income families who sent children to parochial schools (P.A. 77-1890). On Octo-

ber 1, 1973, the Illinois Parochial Plan was declared unconstitutional.

Klinger

v. Howlett, No. 45419 (Ill.
Sup. Ct., Oct. 1, 1973). Enrollment in the schools operated by the Archdiocese of Chicago is down 31 per cent from 1965 levels.
253. See, e.g., Friedman, The Voucher Idea-Selling School Like Groceries, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
254. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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persons can develop to the limits of their capacity.2 55 The theme
runs ubiquitously through the public relations literature published by
Illinois schools and government.2 5 6 The speeches of the present state
superintendent, Dr. Michael Bakalis, reflect consistent repetition of
the quest for improvement-progress--in the state schools.
Not surprisingly, the subject of improving the quality of education
in Illinois schools has surfaced in the regulations. For about two
years the OSPI has been issuing re-drafts of the Program for the Education, Recognition and Supervision of Illinois Schools and on July 1,
1973, enacted the final form.2 57 The program calls for regular evaluation of all Illinois schools and school districts to measure the extent to which they conform to the program's various standards. Depending on the degree of such conformity, the schools will be awarded
one of several levels of recognition status. 8 If the status is less
than full recognition, the inspection team and assistant superintendent for recognition and approval will offer suggestions or requirements concerning the steps necessary to achieve full recognition and
approval. If a subsequent inspection does not reveal compliance
with the suggestions and standards, non-recognized status, whether
probationary or final, could be assigned. If OSPI proceeds to use
its power, this latter step could have extremely dire financial consequences; state funds could be cut off. An analogous recognition
and approval program is planned for application to all private schools.
The theory is an excellent one, entirely consistent with and conducive to realizing the constitutional goal of "high quality free public schools." The practice, as is often the case with innovative
governmental programs administered by largely patronage bureaucracies, falls far short. There are, for example, only token appropriations to execute this state-wide program. The standards themselves,
despite a good faith attempt, are either arbitrary and irrational or
255.

ILL. CONST. art.

256.

See, e.g.,

X, § 1.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION, ACTION GOALS FOR THE SEVENTIES: AN AGENDA FOR ILLINOIS EDUCATION 60 (1972).
See also STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM FOR EVALUATION, SUPERVISION,
RECOGNITION OF SCHOOLS, Circular Series A. No. 160, at iii (1973).

AND

257. STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM FOR EVALUATION, SUPERVISION, AND RECOGNITION OF
SCHOOLS,

258.

Circular Series A. No. 160 (1973).
Id. at 4, 5.
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overly broad. Inquiries to the OSPI have failed to produce a single
school or district where the process of inspection, criticism, compliance and full recognition has been completed. The quality of Illinois schools and thus, education, has yet to significantly improve as
the constitution dictated that it must.
Nevertheless, the idea is established and the OSPI program is still
embryonic. If the OSPI can move more quickly, find a few dollars and qualified people to pursue the inspections and exercise its
as yet untested but theoretically considerable muscle, the process
might work. All persons concerned about students and their education must support the program which shifts the emphasis from
taxes, teacher contracts, new construction and disciplinary actions
to the quality of the product, which is the 'raison d'etre for public
schools. And to date the consciousness and sensitivity about the quality of education on the part of some school board members is inching up to the troglodytic level.
Board members, administrators, teachers, parents, students and
practitioners should be aware of and educated about these standards
and the considerable OSPI rule-making and enforcement powers.
Schools should prepare for and welcome OSPI field inspection teams.
Practitioners will then be called upon to find, interpret and avoid
or challenge various standards and, no doubt, to perform the lawyer's best trick-gain more time within which to comply. The OSPI,
perhaps in the spirit of encouraging a voluntary, cooperative team
effort, has been quite lenient in granting such delays.
The process of improving the quality of education through legal
dictates alone is probably fated to fail, but the ready availability of a
legal structure may allow the Illinois educational establishment to
capitalize fully on the efforts of persons determined to view schools
from the consumer perspective. Illinois lawyers, amateurs in the
field of education, but professionals at shaking down new law, could,
by representing students' interests, imbue the process with a certain
degree of integrity and a resultant reduction in mutilated spirits.

